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INTRODUCTION 
The 2016 presidential election shook American democracy to its 
foundations. In an unprecedented development, the CIA and FBI 
concluded that the Russian government hacked and leaked 
Democratic Party emails in an effort to help Donald Trump win the 
election.1 Trump himself fueled further controversy during the 
campaign when he alleged that the Democrats had rigged the election 
against him and predicted that massive voter fraud would occur on 
Election Day.2 Still more controversy came in the days after the 
election when Jill Stein, the defeated Green Party candidate for 
president, demanded a recount, suggesting without evidence that 
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1. Adam Entous & Ellen Nakashima, FBI in agreement with CIA that Russia aimed to help
Trump win White House, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics 
/clinton-blames-putins-personal-grudge-against-her-for-election-interference/2016/12/16/12f362 
50 -c3be- 11e6-8422-eac61c0ef74d_story.html?utm_term=.3a70e9145dd9.  
2.  Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump says the election is ‘rigged.’ Here’s what his supporters
think that means, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2016/10/18/donald-trump-says-the-election-is-rigged-heres-what-his-supporters-
think-that-means/?utm_term=.bd4025454328; Mahita Gajanan, Donald Trump Claims Election 
Will Be Rigged at Polling Sites, TIME (Oct. 17, 2016), http://time.com/4532679/donald-trump-
election-rigged/; Jon Greenberg, Fact-checking the integrity of the vote in 2016, POLITIFACT (Dec. 
17, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/dec/17/fact-checking-claims-vot 
er-fraud-2016.  
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Russia may have hacked voting machines on Trump’s behalf.3 Most 
remarkable of all, President-elect Trump responded to his Electoral 
College victory by claiming without evidence that he lost the popular 
vote because of millions of illegal votes cast for his Democratic 
opponent, Hillary Clinton.4 
The stunning turn of events and the unprecedented controversy 
that surrounded the election had a profound impact on public opinion. 
A majority of Americans now question the integrity of the nation’s 
election system.5 Accordingly, this article contends that we have 
entered into a dangerous new chapter in the nation’s history that not 
only threatens public confidence in election fairness but potentially 
could even undermine the long-term health of the nation’s democracy. 
In an era of widespread false allegations of election fraud, historic 
levels of hyperpolarization, and intensifying partisanship in election 
administration, the basic voting rights that Americans take for granted 
face serious threats on multiple fronts. 
For the moment at least, the situation is not as bleak as it appears. 
The good news is that the public’s lack of trust in the integrity of 
American elections is not justified. Despite the widespread belief that 
voter fraud is pervasive, the reality is that America’s democratic 
institutions still compare favorably to those of other nations. President 
Trump’s claims of widespread voter fraud had no factual basis, as post-
election investigations repeatedly demonstrated.6 Moreover, recent 
 
 3.  Amanda Holpuch & Jon Swaine, Jill Stein requests Wisconsin recount, alleging hackers 
filed bogus absentee ballots, GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/nov/25/jill-stein-election-recount-clinton-trump-michigan-pennsylvania-wisconsin; 
David E. Sanger, U.S. Officials Defend Integrity of Vote, Despite Hacking Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/25/us/politics/hacking-russia-election-fears-barack-
obama-donald-trump.html. 
 4.  Andrew Restuccia, Trump’s baseless assertions of voter fraud called ‘stunning,’ 
POLITICO (Nov. 27, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/trump-illegal-voting-clinton-
231860; Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Trump Claims, With No Evidence, That ‘Millions 
of People’ Voted Illegally, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/27/us/po 
litics/trump-adviser-steps-up-searing-attack-on-romney.html. 
 5.  Giovanni Russonello, Voters Fear Their Ballot Won’t Count, Poll Shows, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/politics/voter-fraud-poll.html; The 
Economist/YouGov Poll (Dec. 17–20, 2016), https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_ 
uploads/document/ljv2ohxmzj/econTabReport.pdf; Kathy Frankovic, Belief in conspiracies 
largely depends on political identity, YOUGOV (Dec. 27, 2016), https://today. 
yougov.com/news/2016/12/27/belief-conspiracies-largely-depends-political-iden. 
 6.  See David Cottrell, Michael C. Herron & Sean Westwood, We checked Trump’s 
allegations of voter fraud. We found no evidence at all, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/02/we-checked-trumps-alleg 
ations-of-voter-fraud-we-found-no-evidence-at-all/?utm_term=.1a79491491d6 (“[A]n extensive 
study of voter fraud in the 2016 election . . . found no evidence that could support anything like 
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academic studies give the United States high marks for having honest 
elections characterized by robust levels of freedom of speech.7 The 
integrity of the American election system is undergirded by the state 
and federal judiciaries, which have a federal constitutional mandate to 
block racial and gender discrimination in voting and to maintain equal 
protection under the law for all voters. Thus, although not without its 
faults, the United States still stands among the leading liberal 
democracies in the world. 
Ironically, however, the unjustified fear of voter fraud has itself 
become a threat to America’s democratic principles. This article 
identifies three toxic developments that if left unchecked threaten the 
future of voting rights in America. The first is the rise of fake news. As 
the traditional news media has lost its gate-keeper status and as the 
internet has facilitated the rapid spread of misinformation, false 
allegations of voting fraud dominate news cycles. The pervasive nature 
of the claims has triggered a precipitous decline in public confidence in 
election integrity, even though there is no factual basis to justify the 
public’s fear of widespread fraud. The second is the phenomenon of 
hyperpolarization. The partisan divide has reached such historic levels 
that Republicans and Democrats increasingly view the opposing party 
as a threat to the nation’s well-being. Hyperpolarization makes 
partisans more inclined to attempt to limit the political influence of 
opposing voters, a development that is particularly dangerous in the 
United States because of the third toxic feature of contemporary 
politics: partisan control of election administration. Unusual among 
 
Trump’s accusations.”); Nate Cohn, ‘Serious Voter Fraud’ in California and Elsewhere? Um, No, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/upshot/serious-voter-fraud-um-
no.html; Nate Cohn, Trump’s Claim of Millions of Illegal Votes? There’s Simply No Evidence, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/upshot/serious-voter-fraud-um-
no.html?_r=0; Abby Phillip & Mike DeBonis, Without evidence, Trump tells lawmakers 3 million 
to 5 million illegal ballots cost him the popular vote, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/23/at-white-house-trump-tells-
congressional-leaders-3-5-million-illegal-ballots-cost-him-the-popular-vote/?utm_term=.617a28 
b56c01&wpisrc=nl_politics&wpmm=1; Nicholas Fandos, Trump Won’t Back Down From His 
Voting Fraud Lie. Here Are the Facts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/01/24/us/politics/unauthorized-immigrant-voting-trump-lie.html ?hp&action=click&pgtype 
=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT 
.nav=top-news. 
 7.  Claire Cain Miller & Kevin Quealy, Democracy in America, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/upshot/democracy-in-america-how-is-it-doing.html?rref= 
collection%2Fbyline%2Fkevin-quealy&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region 
=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection; 
Results from the Bright Line Watch U.S. Democracy Survey, BRIGHT LINE WATCH, 
http://brightlinewatch.org/?p=167. 
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major democracies, the United States entrusts the majority party with 
responsibility for administering elections and setting voting rules. In 
recent years, partisans have become increasingly aggressive in adopting 
election laws that benefit one party at the expense of the other. The 
real scandal of American politics is not illegal vote-rigging or voter 
fraud but rather the extent to which partisans are legally permitted to 
manipulate election rules for political advantage. 
The United States thus stands at a uniquely dangerous moment in 
its history. Public figures on all ends of the ideological spectrum are 
rightfully warning of the danger to American democracy. Fareed 
Zakaria has observed that the United States risks becoming an 
“illiberal democracy,”8 a term that describes the global phenomenon of 
democratically-elected governments “routinely ignoring constitutional 
limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights.”9 
Zakaria is not alone in seeing a rising threat to America’s liberal 
democratic norms. Many leading conservative intellectuals, such as 
Bret Stephens10 and David Brooks,11 have also sounded the alarm that 
democratic institutions are in jeopardy. Former Bush presidential 
speechwriter David Frum has warned that the Trump Administration 
may usher in a form of populist autocracy by subverting “the 
institutions of democracy and the rule of law.”12 Republican elected 
officials have also expressed deep concern. Senator Lindsay Graham 
 
 8.  Fareed Zakaria, America’s democracy has become illiberal, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-is-becoming-a-land-of-less-liberty/2016/12 
/29/2a91744c-ce09-11e6-a747-d03044780a02_story.html?utm_term=.638c57ec08f3. 
 9.  FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME 
AND ABROAD 17 (2007). 
 10.  See Bret Stephens, Don’t Dismiss President Trump’s Attacks on the Media as Mere 
Stupidity, TIME (Feb. 21, 2017), http://time.com/4675860/donald-trump-fake-news-attacks (“The 
most painful aspect of this has been to watch people I previously considered thoughtful and 
principled conservatives give themselves over to a species of illiberal politics from which I once 
thought they were immune.”); see also Robert Kraychik, Bret Stephens: ‘I’m Gonna Vote for 
Clinton,’ DAILY WIRE (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.dailywire.com/news/10233/bret-stephens-im-
gonna-vote-hillary-clinton-robert-kraychik# (reporting that on FOX News Stephens “repeatedly 
described Donald Trump as ‘a threat to the Republic’”); Bret Stephens, My Former Republican 
Party, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/my-former-republican-party-
1477353852.  
 11.  David Brooks, The Republican Fausts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/opinion/the-republican-fausts.html?rref=collection%2F 
column%2Fdavid-brooks; see also David Brooks, How Should One Resist the Trump 
Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/opinion/how-
should-one-resist-the-trump-administration.html?_r=0 (“It is hard to imagine America turning 
into full fascism, but it is possible to see it sliding into the sort of ‘repressive kleptocracy.’ . . . In 
such a regime, democratic rights are slowly eroded.”).  
 12.  David Frum, How to Build an Autocracy, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/how-to-build-an-autocracy/513872/. 
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declared that Trump’s false claim of widespread voter fraud “shakes 
confidence in our democracy.”13 He urged the president to stop 
“making accusations against our electoral system without 
justification.”14 
The risk that America may evolve into an illiberal democracy is 
particularly high in light of the ongoing battle over voter registration 
restrictions and other laws that limit access to voting.15 In the name of 
safeguarding election integrity, legislatures across the country have 
adopted new voting laws that many courts and scholars have concluded 
made it harder for poor and minority voters to participate in the 
democratic process.16 While reasonable minds may disagree over the 
merits of strict voter identification laws, the fact that such laws are 
implemented by partisan officials in an atmosphere of 
hyperpolarization makes the potential for voter suppression very real 
indeed. All signs suggest the battle over voting laws will only intensify 
in the years ahead. At least 27 states are considering controversial new 
restrictions on voter registration and voting access in 2017.17 As the 
president himself promotes baseless fears of massive voter fraud,18 the 
risk is rising that partisans will be emboldened to further escalate the 
polarized political environment by purging voter registration rolls in 
the name of promoting election integrity.19 A more restrictive approach 
 
 13.  Manu Raju & Tom LoBianco, Graham blasts Trump after latest voter fraud claim, CNN 
(Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/24/politics/lindsey-graham-trump-illegal-votes.  
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Zoltan L. Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi & Lindsay Nielson, Do voter identification laws 
suppress minority voting? Yes. We did the research, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/15/do-voter-identification-
laws-suppress-minority-voting-yes-we-did-the-research/?utm_term=.6df6a6e544c5.  
 16.  See, e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and 
the Price of Democracy, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1023, 1035 (2009) (“Political science research 
suggests that such costs, as represented by registration requirements and photo identification 
requirements, in and of themselves form a barrier to political participation for those who are 
socioeconomically disadvantaged”); N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 
214 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he legislature requested data on the use, by race, of a number of voting 
practices. Upon receipt of the race data, the General Assembly enacted legislation that restricted 
voting and registration in five different ways, all of which disproportionately affected African 
Americans.”); Sari Horwitz, Getting a photo ID so you can vote is easy. Unless you’re poor, black, 
Latino or elderly, WASH. POST (May 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_ 
law/getting-a-photo-id-so-you-can-vote-is-easy-unless-youre-poor-black-latino-or-elderly/2016 
/05/23/8d5474ec-20f0-11e6-8690-f14ca9de2972_story.html?utm_term=.8a1bb41d1ef4.  
 17.  BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., VOTING LAWS ROUNDUP 2017, (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-laws-roundup-2017.  
 18.  Michael D. Shear & Peter Baker, After His Claim of Voter Fraud, Trump Vows “Major 
Investigation,” N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/ 
trump-voting-fraud-false-claim-investigation.html.  
 19.  See Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Voter ID Laws Are So Last (Election) Season, 
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to voter qualifications could also be on the horizon. President Trump 
has advocated ending birthright citizenship,20 a measure that would 
have enormous potential to disenfranchise large numbers of people. 
Finally, a new round of redistricting looms in 2020. The parties are 
already jockeying for control of the redistricting process and the 
opportunity to promote partisan gerrymandering through the next 
decade.21 The rise of big data has given both parties a powerful new tool 
for drawing district lines that dilute votes cast for the opposition party.22 
All of these developments make clear that the voting wars are 
escalating.23 As Americans increasingly view election stakes in 
apocalyptic terms, as false allegations of election fraud spread like 
wildfire, and as partisan officials control election rules, America’s 
democratic institutions face their most serious domestic challenge since 
the enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965. 
This article concludes by proposing three steps to defend and 
preserve the vitality of America’s liberal democratic norms. The first is 
nationwide adoption of non-partisan administration of state and 
federal elections. Peer nations such as Canada long ago embraced non-
partisan election administration as a sensible and necessary measure to 
ensure that all parties and voters are treated fairly in the election 
process. Unfortunately, however, the likelihood of such a reform being 
adopted in the United States is virtually non-existent, at least for the 
 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.bna.com/voter-id-laws-n73014449451/; see also 
Mark Joseph Stern, Donald Trump’s Vote Fraud Investigation Will Finish What the GOP Started, 
SLATE (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/01/ 
donald_trump_s_vote_fraud_investigation_will_finish_what_the_gop_started.html (noting that 
Trump’s voter fraud investigation “will primarily serve as pretext for an assault on voting rights 
at both the state and federal level”). 
 20.  Max Ehrenfreund, Understanding Trump’s plan to end citizenship for undocumented 
immigrants’ kids, WASH POST (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/ 
2015/08/17/understanding-trumps-plan-to-end-citizenship-for-undocumented-immigrants-kids/? 
utm_term=.1cd8f2f7c147. 
 21.  Edward-Isaac Dovere, Obama, Holder to lead post-Trump redistricting campaign, 
POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/obama-holder-redistricting-
gerrymandering-229868.  
 22.  David Daley, The House the GOP Built: How Republicans Used Soft Money, Big Data, 
and High-Tech Mapping to Take Control of Congress and Increase Partisanship, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 
24, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/04/gops-house-seats-are-safe-heres-why. 
html; see also 2012 REDMAP Summary Report, THE REDISTRICTING MAJORITY PROJECT (Jan. 
4, 2013), http://www.redistrictingmajorityproject.com/.  
 23.  On the concept of the “voting wars,” see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: 
FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN xii (2012). Hasen warns that 
“[p]artisans on both sides now buy into the rhetoric of electoral unfairness” as social media outlets 
“allow pernicious messages to be amplified, repeated, and distorted in an echo-chamber of like-
minded voters.” Id. 
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next few years. Amid hyperpolarization, majority parties in the state 
legislatures are extremely unlikely to unilaterally relinquish the 
political advantages that come with control of election administration. 
As a result, the reality is that non-partisan election administration is 
years and perhaps even decades away. 
Accordingly, the second step is the most realistic and important in 
the short and medium term: judicial intervention. Historically the state 
and federal judiciaries have generally taken a deferential approach to 
legislative control of election administration. But the Supreme Court 
itself has recognized the constitutional threat posed by partisan control 
of election administration. In a famous footnote to the 1938 United 
States v. Carolene Products case,24 the Supreme Court suggested that 
voting rules that insulate incumbent parties from political competition 
or target minority voters should be closely scrutinized by the courts.25 
In this dangerous political era, courts should take an aggressive posture 
to defend voting rights from toxic partisanship. Recent rulings suggest 
that the federal circuit courts of appeal increasingly recognize that 
partisan-inspired voting restrictions threaten to disenfranchise voters. 
Reason exists, therefore, for cautious optimism that more state and 
federal courts will see the need for judicial intervention to protect 
voting rights and democratic institutions. 
The third and final step involves a new tool—the bipartisan 
supermajority principle—that will further assist courts in policing 
hyper-partisanship in election administration. As recent scholarship 
has made clear, there are a variety of constitutional grounds that courts 
may invoke to prevent partisan control of election administration from 
resulting in diminished competition and voter suppression.26 In 
building on that scholarship, this article concludes by proposing that 
courts should view any new law that burdens voting rights as 
presumptively invalid if not adopted by a bipartisan supermajority of 
the legislature. 
 
 24.  304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 25.  Id. at 152 n.4. 
 26.  See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 16, at 1067 (“Rather than a balancing test that defaults to the 
interests of the state, the test should be structured to require the state to demonstrate that the 
means it has adopted in its voter identification laws represent a significant interest in preventing 
voter fraud coupled with a showing that the conditional costs—direct and indirect—to the voter 
are minimized in the scheme the government is implementing.”); Joshua A. Douglas, The Right 
to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 138–39 (2012) (“Flipping the normal 
federal framework and imposing a presumption of invalidity to laws that add voter qualifications 
is justified because state constitutions already support this analytical move.”). 
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The bottom line is that hyperpolarization, partisan election 
administration, and unfounded fears of election fraud must not be 
allowed to subvert America’s liberal democratic norms. Whatever 
mechanism that the courts ultimately choose to adopt, the long-term 
health of our democratic institutions depends on preventing partisan 
political operators from curtailing voting rights, undermining political 
competition, and eroding the pluralistic principles of modern American 
democracy.27 
I.  THE TOXIC MIX 
The notion is deeply rooted in America that the story of democracy 
is one of linear progress.28 Writing in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville 
observed that the inevitable march of American history was one in 
which the “forces of democracy are strengthened.”29 But the 2016 
election put optimistic faith in the resilience of American democracy to 
a searing test. The vicious, ugly and disheartening election was plagued 
by false allegations of voter fraud, extreme partisanship, efforts to 
rollback voting rights, and widespread paranoia that the election’s 
outcome was rigged. This toxic combination has produced a stunning 
and dangerous decline in public confidence in the integrity of the 
American election system. 
A.  Fake News 
As the 2016 campaign demonstrated, American political campaigns 
unfold within a news media environment that is vastly more 
fragmented than ever before. In the 1970s, print and broadcast 
journalism was highly concentrated in a handful of major national news 
outlets, such as CBS News, Time magazine, and newspapers such as the 
Wall Street Journal and the New York Times.30 A far different news 
world prevails today. Traditional news journalism has shrunk 
dramatically both in terms of consumers and profitability. For example, 
average daily newspaper readership has fallen to 50-year lows,31 20,000 
 
 27.  On this issue, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Foxes, Henhouses, and Commissions: 
Assessing the Nonpartisan Model in Election Administration, Redistricting, and Campaign 
Finance, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 467 (2013).  
 28.  ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES xxi (2009). 
 29.  ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 28 (1990). 
 30.  HERBERT J. GANS, DECIDING WHAT’S NEWS: A STUDY OF CBS EVENING NEWS, NBC 
NIGHTLY NEWS, NEWSWEEK, AND TIME xi–xii (2004). 
 31.  PHILIP MEYER, THE VANISHING NEWSPAPER: SAVING JOURNALISM IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 1–2 (2d ed. 2009). 
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newspaper workers have been laid off since the 1990s,32 and the 
financial value of the newspaper industry has contracted 
precipitously.33 Broadcast television news has not fared any better. A 
2016 study by Oxford University found that television news audiences 
are shrinking just as fast as newspaper readership, especially among 
younger viewers.34 In a sign of the potentially bleak future of television 
news, the average age of Fox News viewers has risen to 67 and the 
average age of CNN viewers is now almost 62.35 In contrast, social 
media and online sites have benefited from the decline of the 
traditional news media. Facebook, a social media website, is now a news 
source for 44 percent of Americans.36 As advertising revenue has 
steadily shrunk for newspapers like the New York Times, Facebook saw 
its advertising revenue increase by nearly 60%.37 
There are many positive features of the democratization of 
information. In the pre-internet age, traditional news media outlets—
such as the Wall Street Journal or CBS News—served as gatekeepers of 
national news information. The print and broadcast media’s monopoly 
on access to information limited the public’s ability to decide for itself 
what was newsworthy. Conservatives also often complained that 
gatekeeper institutions such as CBS News improperly injected a liberal 
editorial slant on ostensibly neutral news reports.38 The rise of the 
internet has ended the monopoly exercised by the traditional news 
media and in the process it has made more information available to 
more people than ever before.39 The range of news sources on the 
 
 32.  Michael Barthel, Newspapers: Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 15, 2016), 
http://www.journalism.org/2016/06/15/newspapers-fact-sheet.  
 33.  Amy Mitchell & Katerina Eva Matsa, The declining value of U.S. newspapers, PEW RES. 
CTR. (May 22, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/22/the-declining-value-of-u-
s-newspapers.  
 34.  Peter Preston, TV news faces a threat familiar to newspapers, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 17, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/11/the-print-apocalypse-and-how-to-
survive-it/506429.  
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Jeffrey Gottfried & Elisa Shearer, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016, PEW 
RES. CTR. (May 26, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-
platforms-2016/; Mike Isaac, Facebook, in Cross Hairs After Election, Is Said to Question Its 
Influence, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/14/technology/facebook 
-is-said-to-question-its-influence-in-election.html?_r=0.  
 37.  Derek Thompson, The Print Apocalypse and How to Survive It, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 
3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/11/the-print-apocalypse-and-how-to-
survive-it/506429.  
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internet covers all ends of the ideological spectrum from Breitbart to 
the Huffington Post. The democratization of news has even extended 
to journalistic activities. The internet has empowered ordinary 
Americans to create their own news platforms and disseminate 
information for free on the internet.40 
But one consequence of media fragmentation has been the rise of 
“fake news,” a phenomenon that became a defining feature of the 2016 
election.41 Although partisans might describe any news report they do 
not like as “fake news,”42 the term generally refers to baseless 
allegations republished in the guise of a genuine news story.43 The 
internet has played a key role in the rise of fake news. Academic studies 
have found that people often have difficulty distinguishing fact from 
fiction on the internet, which makes it the ideal forum for disseminating 
misinformation.44 The 2016 election confirmed such findings, as a 
bewildering array of fabricated election stories received extraordinarily 
wide circulation.45 Stories ranged from claims that Pope Francis 
endorsed Donald Trump to allegations that Hillary Clinton sold 
weapons to the terrorist group ISIS.46 By a 4 to 1 margin, most “fake 
news” stories targeted Clinton’s campaign.47 
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and Victor Pickard eds. 2011). 
 41.  Angie Drobnic Holan, 2016 Lie of the Year: Fake News, POLITIFACT (Dec. 13, 2016), 
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fake news, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ 
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Mainstream Media, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/25/us/politics/ 
fake-news-claims-conservatives-mainstream-media-.html.  
 43.  Elle Hunt, What is fake news? How to spot it and what you can do to stop it, GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/dec/18/what-is-fake-news-pizzagate.  
 44.  See Jean-Bruno Renard, Negatory Rumors: From the Denial of Reality to Conspiracy 
Theory, in RUMOR MILLS: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF RUMOR AND LEGEND 236 (Gary Alan Fine 
et al., eds., 2005) (“[T]he Internet tends to make it difficult to distinguish between true 
information and false rumor, reality and fiction.”). 
 45.  Andrew Higgins, Mike McIntire & Gabriel J.X. Dance, Inside a Fake News Sausage 
Factory: ‘This Is All About Income,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
11/25/world/europe/fake-news-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-georgia.html.  
 46.  Hannah Ritchie, Read all about it: The biggest fake news stories of 2016, CNBC (Dec. 30, 
2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/30/read-all-about-it-the-biggest-fake-news-stories-of-2016. 
html.  
 47.  Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories 
Outperformed Real News on Facebook, BUZZFEED (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com 
/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook?utm_term=. 
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One of the leading examples was a fake news story that spun a 
conspiracy theory out of the tragic murder of a young Democratic 
National Committee staffer named Seth Rich.48 Although police 
believed that Rich was the victim of a random robbery attempt,49 a 
website alleged that a Democratic hit team killed the staffer to prevent 
him from testifying against Hillary Clinton in the FBI investigation of 
Clinton’s State Department email system.50 The internet site Wikileaks 
picked up the baseless conspiracy theory, spreading it further,51 which 
in turn led the traditional news media to report on the allegations 
against Clinton. Although mainstream news outlets described the 
conspiracy theory as “wild Internet speculation”52 and “another round 
of Clinton conspiracy theories,”53 such reporting gave the false 
allegations even wider circulation. 
In a normal election, the significance of fake news might be 
downplayed as an unimportant sideshow. After all, American politics 
have a long history of baseless and defamatory allegations.54 But four 
things made the influence of fake news in the 2016 election different 
and more dangerous than previous incarnations of politically-
motivated misinformation and scurrilous allegations. First, fake news 
spread at an alarmingly fast rate in 2016.55 The internet’s 
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Killed the DNC Staffer, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/gop-lobbyist-
reward-seth-rich-dnc-499653; Roig-Franzia, supra note 48. 
 50.  Kim LaCapria, Seth Rich Homicide: A conspiracy site latched on to the tragic murder of 
young DNC staffer Seth Rich to spread false information about his killing, SNOPES (Aug. 10, 2016), 
http://www.snopes.com/seth-conrad-rich/.  
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Staffer, SLATE (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/08/09/wikileaks 
_is_fanning_a_conspiracy_theory_that_hillary_murdered_a_dnc_staffer.html.  
 52.  See, e.g., Joseph Morton, WikiLeaks Offers $20,000 Reward For Help Finding Omaha 
Native Seth Rich’s Killer, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.omaha. 
com/news/crime/wikileaks-offers-reward-for-help-finding-omaha-native-seth-
rich/article_cfb287bc-5e98-11e6-ae0c-8b471b8cbfbb.html.  
 53.  Jeff Stein, Seth Rich: Inside the Killing of the DNC Staffer, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 20, 2016), 
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 54.  See, e.g., Adrienne LaFrance, How the Fake News Crisis of 1896 Explains Trump, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/the-fake-
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democratization of the dissemination of information has facilitated the 
spread of fake news like never before. A study by BuzzFeed concluded 
that in the final three months of the 2016 campaign, the twenty most 
popular fake election stories on Facebook reached more than 8.7 
million readers, whereas the twenty most popular real election news 
stories on Facebook only reached 7.3 million readers.56 Critics pointed 
out that the Buzzfeed analysis underestimated the number of real news 
stories on Facebook because the analysis did not include stories from 
Reuters, the Associated Press and small newspapers.57 But in any case 
it is clear that fake news stories reached a massive audience that 
rivalled real news during the 2016 election.58 Facebook and Google 
both took the problem so seriously that after the election they 
announced plans to combat the spread of fake news on their websites.59 
Their response reflected the undeniable fact that Facebook, Google, 
and other websites facilitated the dissemination of news—fake and real 
alike—to a degree impossible in previous eras. 
Second, the public has proven to be remarkably gullible when it 
comes to fake news circulated on the internet. A new study by Stanford 
University found that even young people, who tend to be more 
technologically sophisticated than older Americans,60 are “easily 
duped” by fake news stories.61 The public’s inability to distinguish truth 
from fact is particularly troubling for democracies, since the quality of 
self-government depends on voters making informed choices. Thus, in 
summarizing their findings, the authors of the Stanford study warned, 
“we worry that democracy is threatened by the ease at which 
disinformation about civic issues is allowed to spread and flourish.”62 
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A post-election survey confirmed the Stanford researchers’ warnings. 
A December 2016 Pew Research Center poll found that eighty-eight 
percent of Americans believe that fake news has caused some 
confusion over basic facts and sixty-four percent believe it has caused 
great confusion.63 The public’s confusion undermines the notion of 
commonly agreed upon objective facts64 and exacerbates the natural 
human tendency toward confirmation bias, whereby we selectively 
choose facts that support our pre-existing biases.65 Confirmation bias 
thus reinforces political polarization, as Republicans and Democrats 
seek out information, including fake news, which reinforces their 
political worldview.66 Acknowledging the problem, Facebook founder 
Mark Zuckerberg expressed regret that fake news on Facebook had 
increased political polarization.67 
Third, fabricated news reports did more than just cast false 
aspersions on the candidates. During the 2016 campaign, fake news 
stories spread baseless fears about the integrity of the election results.68 
For example, six weeks before Election Day, a Republican legislative 
aide in Maryland named Cameron Harris created a fake internet 
newspaper in order to circulate a completely fabricated story that Ohio 
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is creating confusion, punching holes in what is true, causing a kind of fun-house effect that leaves 
the reader doubting everything, including real news.”).  
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Guises, 2 REV. OF GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 176 (1998) (“People may treat evidence in a biased way 
when they are motivated by the desire to defend beliefs that they wish to maintain.”).  
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Misinformation, 47 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 241, 245 (2015) (“Surveys show that Democrats and 
Republicans (and liberals and conservatives) approach the same rumor in very different ways. 
More generally, research has found that people are more likely to accept rumors that are 
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(Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2017/02/17/Facebooks-Mark-Zuckerberg-
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TIMES (Nov. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/business/media/medias-next-
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Democrats had been caught in a criminal conspiracy to commit election 
fraud.69 Under the headline “BREAKING: ‘Tens of thousands’ of 
fraudulent Clinton votes found in Ohio warehouse,” the Republican 
aide’s fake news story alleged that “the Clinton campaign’s likely goal 
was to slip the fake ballot boxes in with the real ballot boxes when they 
went to official election judges on November 8th.”70 The fake news 
story even included a picture of a man standing behind dozens of ballot 
boxes, which the story falsely claimed showed the Ohio “electrical 
worker” who discovered the boxes.71 In fact, the picture actually 
showed a British campaign worker during an election in the United 
Kingdom.72 Nevertheless, the fake news story was so widely 
disseminated that more than 6 million people shared the story on the 
internet and Ohio election authorities found themselves forced to 
launched an investigation into the allegations.73 Although Ohio 
authorities debunked the story,74 the damage had already been done. 
Even Harris himself later expressed surprise that so many people 
believed the fake news story: “At first it kind of shocked me — the 
response I was getting. How easily people would believe it. It was 
almost like a sociological experiment.”75 The New York Times called it 
a “fake news masterpiece.”76 The circulation of fake news stories about 
voter fraud was so pervasive that in his final days in the White House, 
President Barack Obama made a point of publicly condemning 
allegations of election fraud as “fake news” that “has constantly been 
disproved.”77 
Fourth, the spread of fake news was not limited to shadowy internet 
sites. The winner of the 2016 presidential election himself played a key 
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role in spreading false allegations of voting fraud. Throughout the 
campaign, and even after his victory, Donald Trump impugned the 
integrity of the electoral process. For example, when he lagged in the 
polls in mid-October,78 Trump claimed without evidence that the 
election was “rigged” against him79 “at many polling places”80 by “large 
scale voter fraud happening on and before [E]lection [D]ay.”81 Even 
more remarkable were allegations that Trump made after the election. 
When the states’ certified election results revealed that Hillary Clinton 
had won the popular vote by nearly 3 million votes,82 Trump baselessly 
claimed that “millions” of people had voted illegally for Clinton.83 On 
Twitter he declared, “In addition to winning the Electoral College in a 
landslide, I won the popular vote if you deduct the millions of people 
who voted illegally.”84 In a subsequent Tweet he wrote, “Serious voter 
fraud in Virginia, New Hampshire and California — so why isn’t the 
media reporting on this? Serious bias — big problem!”85 Without 
offering evidence, Trump later told congressional Republicans that 
three to five million illegal votes were cast against him in the election, 
a figure that conveniently exceeded Clinton’s popular vote margin of 
victory.86 
Trump’s allegations of voter fraud and vote-rigging were 
completely baseless.87 A post-election investigation by the Washington 
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Post found only four confirmed cases of voter fraud in the entire 2016 
election.88 Likewise, Dartmouth College researchers conducted a 
comprehensive study of the 2016 election and found no evidence to 
support Trump’s allegations.89 Even leading Republicans, such as 
House Speaker Paul Ryan and Senator Lindsay Graham, admitted that 
“no evidence” had been found to support Trump’s allegations.90 Jon 
Husted, the Republican Secretary of State of Ohio, responded to 
Trump’s voter fraud claims by observing that while it was “[e]asy to 
vote” in American elections, it was “hard to cheat.”91 As Husted 
explained, voter fraud “is rare and when it happens, we hold people 
accountable.”92 Similarly, the National Association of Secretaries of 
State, an organization whose membership is made up primarily of 
Republicans,93 announced that it was “not aware of any evidence that 
supports the voter fraud claims made by President Trump.”94 Most 
remarkable of all, during the 2016 recount  in  Michigan,  Trump’s  own  
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legal team admitted that “all available evidence suggests that the 2016 
general election was not tainted by fraud or mistake.”95 
Trump was not the only presidential candidate to question the 
integrity of the election with false claims. On the other end of the 
political spectrum, Green Party candidate Jill Stein filed for recounts in 
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan on the basis of her unfounded 
allegation that “we have a voting system which has been proven to 
basically be wide open to hackers”96 She further asserted without proof 
that hackers might have submitted fraudulent absentee ballots.97 To be 
sure, Stein’s demand for a recount came in the context of extraordinary 
foreign involvement in the presidential campaign. In the summer of 
2016, Wikileaks disclosed Clinton campaign emails that the Russian 
government had hacked from Democratic National Committee 
computer systems.98 An investigation by the FBI and CIA concluded 
that the Russian government had hacked the emails in order to 
embarrass the Democrats and facilitate Trump’s victory in the 
presidential election.99 
Crucially, however, Stein had no evidence that Russia or anyone 
else tampered with the nation’s voting machines.100 Although court 
orders ended the recounts in Michigan and Pennsylvania before they 
could be completed,101 Wisconsin’s recount confirmed Trump’s victory 
 
 95.  Philip Bump, Reminder: In an Anti-Recount Filing, Trump’s Lawyers Said the Election 
Was ‘Not Tainted By Fraud or Mistake,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/05/in-an-anti-recount-filing-trumps-
lawyers-say-the-election-was-not-tainted-by-fraud-or-mistake/?utm_term=.4bb075fcd91e.  
 96.  Sanger, supra note 3.  
 97.  Amanda Holpuch & Jon Swaine, Jill Stein Requests Wisconsin Recount, Alleging 
Hackers Filed Bogus Absentee Ballots, GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/25/jill-stein-election-recount-clinton-trump-
michigan-pennsylvania-wisconsin.  
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29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/us/politics/russia-election-hacking-sanctions.html.  
 99.  Adam Entous & Ellen Nakashima, FBI in Agreement with CIA That Russia Aimed to 
Help Trump Win White House, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/clinton-blames-putins-personal-grudge-against-her-for-election-interference/2016/12/ 
16/12f36250-c3be-11e6-8422-eac61c0ef74d_story.html?utm_term=.3a70e9145dd9.  
 100.  Carl Bialik & Rob Arthur, Demographics, Not Hacking, Explain The Election Results, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 23, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/demographics-not-
hacking-explain-the-election-results/.  
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in the state102 and turned up no evidence that hackers had compromised 
the state’s voting systems.103 Most important of all, an examination of 
voting systems by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security 
found no evidence whatsoever that hackers had tampered with voting 
machines in the 2016 election.104 Nevertheless, because a presidential 
candidate demanded a recount on the basis of her false allegations of 
election fraud, traditional news outlets105 ended up reporting on the 
baseless speculation that the election system was rigged by Russia.106 
The ease with which fake news, misinformation, and false 
allegations spread like wildfire is now a disturbing hallmark of modern 
politics. Vice President Al Gore once celebrated the internet as the 
“information superhighway,”107 but instead of becoming a powerful 
instrument for the dissemination of facts, the internet has confused and 
misled Americans as much as it has informed them. The implications 
for election administration and American democracy are deeply 
troubling. In the internet age, even an election with no evidence of 
improprieties or significant tabulation errors can be inundated with 
false claims of voter fraud. 
But fake news is only one of the toxic elements of contemporary 
American politics. Hyperpolarization constitutes the second poisonous 
development as America’s internal political divisions have taken on 
epidemic proportions. 
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it Wanted, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything 
/wp/2016/11/28/whether-or-not-russians-hacked-the-election-they-messed-with-our-
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Internet, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
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B.  Hyperpolarization 
Even in the best of times, rampant charges of election fraud would 
shake confidence in American democracy. But these are far from the 
best of times in American politics. The 2016 election played out against 
the backdrop of years of intensifying political polarization as 
Republicans and Democrats increasingly see each other as a threat to 
the country. 
The term “polarization” refers to intense partisan conflict that 
replaces traditional norms of civil discourse and bipartisan agreement 
with bitterly hostile political rhetoric and straight party-line voting.108 
When polarization occurs, the political center shrinks as both parties 
move toward their ideological extremes.109 In a polarized political 
system, ideological differences between the two parties are stark and 
the opportunities for compromise and consensus are sharply 
constricted if not eliminated altogether.110 
Polarization has occurred in cycles throughout American history. 
The first major episode of political polarization occurred in the 1790s 
as the new nation divided between the urban-centered Federalists of 
Alexander Hamilton and the agrarian-focused Democratic-
Republicans of Thomas Jefferson.111 In the 1860s the United States 
experienced the most devastating episode of political polarization in its 
history. The national divide over slavery culminated in the secession of 
11 southern states, which in turn led to the Civil War.112 The war ended 
in Union victory, but at the cost of more than 600,000 American lives.113 
On a far less destructive scale, episodes of polarization would continue 
to plague the country in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries until a fragile political consensus took root during the era of 
the Second World War and early Cold War.114 The mid-century political 
 
 108.  On the concept of polarization, see Nathaniel Persily, Introduction, in SOLUTIONS TO 
POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 4–14 (Nathaniel Persily, ed., 2015). 
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 110.  Id. at 4–10. 
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(2014). 
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consensus resulted from the fact that the parties accepted ideological 
diversity within their ranks, as the Republican Party included a strong 
liberal-progressive wing and the Democratic Party included a strong 
southern-conservative wing.115 
Today, however, American politics are experiencing an 
extraordinarily intense period of polarization, the most extreme in 
more than 100 years.116 The trend toward hyperpolarization began in 
the 1970s and steadily intensified in the years that followed.117 The 
trend toward hyperpolarization closely tracked the growing ideological 
homogeneity of the two major parties, as liberals congregated in the 
Democratic Party and conservatives congregated in the Republican 
Party.118 Some studies have found that Republicans have moved more 
sharply to the right than Democrats have to the left,119 but a 2015 study 
found that polarization “appears uniform across parties.”120 In any case, 
the ideological resorting of the parties has given rise to wide policy 
differences on issues such as abortion, health care, foreign policy, and 
taxes.121 The center of the political spectrum has contracted accordingly, 
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leaving little room for political compromise or even dialogue across 
ideological lines.122 The parties are so ideologically divided that 
Congressional voting patterns are more polarized than at any time 
since the Civil War and Reconstruction era.123 Further complicating 
matters is the internal fragmentation of the two parties, which has 
reduced the power of party leaders to find common ground and bridge 
party divides.124 The closely-contested nature of recent elections has 
only intensified polarization levels, as the outcome of a single election 
can result in dramatic changes in domestic and foreign policy 
depending on which party prevails.125 
Polarization even extends to disagreement over basic facts. As Carl 
Cannon has observed, “excess partisanship literally inhibits Americans 
from processing information that challenges their biases.”126 A 2010 
study by Adam Berinsky underscored the political ramifications of fake 
news when it found that partisan biases make Democrats and 
Republicans particularly receptive to misinformation that reinforces 
their preexisting beliefs.127 For example, Republicans opposed to 
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has-risen-sharply-where-is-it-going-next/?utm_term=.d2052da99638.  
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Persily, ed., 2015). 
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(William A. Galston and Pietro S. Nivola, eds., 2006). 
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environmental regulation consistently get basic facts wrong about 
climate change when surveyed.128 Even objective evidence fails to 
change the minds of those determined to view facts in a subjectively 
partisan light. For example, after President Trump’s inauguration 
ceremony, 15 percent of his supporters insisted that Trump’s inaugural 
drew the largest crowd ever, even after being confronted with 
photographic evidence that the 2009 Obama inauguration attracted a 
much larger crowd of onlookers.129 But it is not just Republicans who 
wear partisan blinders. Democrats also show similar biases.130 Studies 
have found that Republicans and Democrats alike tend to ignore news 
stories that challenge their pre-existing beliefs and blindly accept 
stories that reinforce their partisan prejudices, even if the information 
is false.131 Hence, fake news and political polarization go hand-in-
hand.132 
Hyperpolarization is particularly alarming at a time when partisan 
affiliation correlates strongly with race. The United States is a 
multiracial democracy but the two parties increasingly reflect different 
Americas. In 2016 Clinton carried African Americans by a margin of 88 
percent to 8 percent, and she carried Latinos and Asian Americans by 
a margin of 65 percent to 29 percent.133 Trump, in contrast, carried 
whites by a margin of 58 percent to 37 percent.134 The 2016 election was 
consistent with long-term trends whereby the Republican Party has 
become increasingly white and rural and the Democratic Party has 
become increasingly diverse and urban.135 The racial realignment of the 
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TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/upshot/why-more-democrats-are-
now-embracing-conspiracy-theories.html.   
 131.  Amanda Taub, The Real Story About Fake News Is Partisanship, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 
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two parties dates to the 1960s and 1970s when a backlash against the 
Civil Rights Movement led white southerners to move from the 
Democratic Party to the Republican Party.136 Conversely, African 
Americans shifted their political allegiances from Republicans to 
Democrats,137 and today Latino and Asian American voters also 
predominantly affiliate with the Democratic Party.138 The disturbing 
conclusion is that with the two parties divided by race,139 
hyperpolarization threatens to intensify racial antagonism. Indeed, it is 
probably not a coincidence that the rise in political polarization closely 
parallels recent surveys that find Americans increasingly view race 
relations as bad and getting worse.140 
The risk that hyperpolarization will intensify racial divisions is 
amplified by historic levels of partisan antipathy. Republicans and 
Democrats have come to profoundly dislike one another. A 2012 study 
in Public Opinion Quarterly of survey data from 1960 to 2010 found an 
8-fold increase in the percentage of Republicans and Democrats who 
said they would be “displeased” if their son or daughter married a 
member of a different political party.141 Other recent surveys have also 
recorded unprecedented levels of partisan antipathy not just among 
party elites but also among ordinary Americans.142 A 2014 Pew 
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PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/27/the-
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Research Center analysis of public opinion data concluded that “the 
level of antipathy that members of each party feel toward the opposing 
party has surged over the past two decades. Not only do greater 
numbers of those in both parties have negative views of the other side, 
those negative views are increasingly intense.”143 A 2015 study by 
Shanto Iyengar and Sean Westwood found that partisan hostility 
promotes biases that are even stronger than racial discrimination.144 
Polarization has become so intense and so pervasive it undermines 
the ties that bind the nation together. The country is self-sorting into a 
collection of like-minded partisan enclaves, where the idea of 
ideological diversity is viewed with disdain and hostility.145 For example, 
demographic studies have found that Republican voters increasingly 
choose to live among fellow Republicans in low population density 
areas and Democratic voters increasingly choose to live among fellow 
Democrats in high population density areas.146 The 2016 election 
highlighted the extraordinary extent to which Republicans and 
Democrats have separated themselves geographically. Over 60 percent 
of Americans live in “landslide” counties that voted for either Clinton 
or Trump by at least 20 percentage points.147 In contrast, in 1992 only 38 
percent of Americans lived in a county that the Republican or 
Democratic presidential candidate carried by 20 points or more.148 The 
disturbing conclusion is that the United States is evolving into two 
distinct countries—a racially-diverse Democratic Party concentrated in 
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the cities and a heavily-white Republican Party concentrated in rural 
areas, small towns, and exurbs.149 Moreover, the two countries despise 
and distrust each other, as the partisan antipathy surveys reveal. 
The geographical and social separation of Democrats and 
Republicans bodes ominously for the future unity of the nation and the 
vitality of its democratic institutions. In the hyperpolarized political 
environment that prevails today, partisans view election stakes as 
existential in nature. According to a Pew Research Center study, 36% 
of Republicans view Democratic policies as a “threat to the nation’s 
well-being” and 27% of Democrats express the same dark view of 
Republicans.150 The study also found that 43 percent of Republicans 
and 38 percent of Democrats have a “very unfavorable” view of the 
other party.151 Amid such a hyperpolarized political system, the 
defeated party views the winning side as illegitimate and unworthy of 
governing.152 In such a poisonous political atmosphere, partisans are 
incentivized to go outside the normal conventions of politics to block 
the other party from governing effectively.153 The government 
shutdown in 2013154 and the Senate’s refusal in 2016 to even grant a 
hearing to Merrick Garland, President Obama’s Supreme Court 
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be-harbinger-of-new-round-of-hyper-partisanship/2017/01/14/f72db5a2-da8d-11e6-9a36-
1d296534b31e_story.html?utm_term=.5f8d8ac1f135. 
 153.  See Ilya Somin, Three issues I Changed My Mind About in 2016, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/31/three-issues-i-
changed-my-mind-about-in-2016/?utm_term=.6404652a5117 (“The more polarized we are, the 
greater the partisan bias, and the greater the tendency to reject anything associated with the 
opposition. Polarization also makes voters and political activists more willing to tolerate bad 
behavior by their own party and its leaders.”). 
 154.  Molly Ball, Republicans Shut Down the Government for Nothing, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 
16, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/10/republicans-shut-down-the-
government-for-nothing/280611/.  
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nominee,155 are just two of many recent examples of the increasing 
willingness of partisans to break with institutional precedent and 
engage in systematic obstructionism.156 The departure from historical 
norms of political accommodation and compromise has set off a cycle 
of escalation, whereby both parties engage in ever more extreme tactics 
to stymie the opposing party.157 The result is a profoundly dysfunctional 
government and a toxic political atmosphere. 
From the vantage point of election administration, the crucial point 
is hyperpolarization makes partisans far more willing to engage in anti-
democratic measures. After all, if the stakes are nothing less than the 
well-being of the nation, merely voicing disagreement with the 
opposing party is not enough. Self-serving patriotic justifications may 
thus inspire partisans to seek ways to make it harder for the other side 
to get its vote out. Unfortunately, the long-standing American practice 
of partisan election administration gives partisans the opportunity to 
do precisely that. 
C.  Partisan Election Administration 
Hyperpolarization and unfounded fears of systemic voting fraud 
pose a threat to any democracy, but they are particularly dangerous in 
the United States. Most western democracies place control of election 
administration in the hands of neutral, non-partisan officials.158 But not 
 
 155.  Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and the 
Constitution Really Say about President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice 
Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 53 (2016); Adam Liptak, Study Calls Snub of Obama’s 
Supreme Court Pick Unprecedented, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016 
/06/14/us/politics/obama-supreme-court-merrick-garland.html. 
 156.  See Michael J. Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in 
SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 51 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015) (“The 
negotiation failures resulting from polarization have done much to undermine governance in the 
United States by leading to gridlock and lower quality legislation and by harming the functioning 
of the executive and judicial branches.”). 
 157.  The federal court nomination process is a preeminent example. See Russell Wheeler, 
Judicial Nominations and Confirmations: Fact and Fiction, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 30, 2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2013/12/30/judicial-nominations-and-confirmations-fact-
and-fiction/ (“[T]he process is now so broken than both parties might see it in their self-interest 
to consider a three-branch, truly bi-partisan commission to suggest fixes that the president and 
senate in place in 2017 might consider.”); SARAH A. BINDER AND FORREST MALTZMAN, 
ADVICE AND DISSENT: THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 103 (2009) 
(“Intense ideological disagreement coupled with the rising importance of a closely balanced 
federal bench has brought combatants in the wars of advice and consent to new tactics and new 
crises as the two parties struggle to shape the future of the courts.”).  
 158.  See Thomas E. Mann, Redistricting Reform: What is Desirable? Possible?, in PARTY 
LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 93 (Thomas E. 
Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005) (“The United States is clearly an outlier in the democratic 
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the United States. Unusual among leading democracies, the United 
States entrusts the administration of elections to partisan political 
operators.159 Consequently, for all of the controversy over allegations 
of voter fraud and other forms of illegal election activity, the real 
scandal of American politics is what is legal. 
The American practice of partisan election administration 
manifests itself in two ways. The first is in the selection of election 
officials. In 33 of the 50 states, the chief election officer is a partisan 
politician.160 And in many of the remaining states the governor chooses 
the chief election officer, an appointment method that only thinly veils 
the political nature of the selection process.161 Often holding the office 
of Secretary of State, the chief election officer is extremely important 
in both federal and state election administration.162 
The Florida election controversy in 2000 demonstrated how 
partisan control of the Secretary of State’s office can influence election 
outcomes. In the extremely close 2000 presidential election between 
Texas Governor George Bush and Vice President Al Gore, the 
Electoral College outcome turned on the results in the state of 
Florida.163 Bush led Gore by only a few hundred votes in Florida after 
state election officials conducted a machine recount.164 In the days 
following the machine recount, the critical question was whether 
Florida law permitted a statewide hand recount before the secretary of 
state, Katherine Harris, certified the election results.165 Harris was a 
 
world when it comes to the role that politicians play in shaping the rules that affect their electoral 
future.”). 
 159.  See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 127 (2009) (“The United States also is unusual, though not unique, in 
vesting responsibility in officials who are affiliated with political parties.”). 
 160.  MICHAEL R. DIMINO, SR., BRADLEY A. SMITH & MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE, 
UNDERSTANDING ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 215 (2017).  
 161.  See Tokaji, supra note 159, at 132 (“Other states have appointment processes, but, in 
many of those states, the chief election official is appointed by the state’s governor (who, of 
course, is elected through a partisan process).”). 
 162.  See Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and The Secretary: The Crucial Role of State 
Election Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to Democracy, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 343, 343–44 (2008) (“While there are several entities and actors that each interact to 
shape, enforce, and execute election law and policy, none plays a role that is as crucial as the 
individual or group of individuals who are charged with overseeing the administration of all 
elections in the state.”); id. at 346 (“[I]t is the Secretary of State who plays the pivotal role in 
properly administering and overseeing elections to ensure that these dual values of accuracy and 
access are promoted, enforced, and attained.”). 
 163.  KEYSSAR, supra note 28, at 258. 
 164.  EDWARD B. FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES: THE HISTORY OF DISPUTED ELECTIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 286 (2016). 
 165.  Id. at 286–87. 
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Republican elected official who headed Bush’s campaign committee in 
Florida, and thus had an obvious conflict of interest.166 Rather than 
recuse herself, however, she openly consulted with Bush’s lawyers and 
embraced their argument that Florida law did not provide for a manual 
recount before certification of the election results.167 By refusing to 
direct a pre-certification manual recount, she succeeded in delaying the 
proceedings to such an extent that the United States Supreme Court 
ultimately determined that Florida lacked sufficient time to complete 
the recount, a decision that effectively handed the election to Bush.168 
The revelation that Harris had hired a private company to conduct a 
purge of alleged felons from Florida’s voting rolls using lists of 
questionable accuracy further deepened Democratic bitterness over 
Harris’s relentlessly partisan approach to the 2000 election.169 The 
haphazard and nakedly partisan procedure removed from the voting 
lists many qualified voters, most of whom appeared to be Democrats.170 
It is important to note that Harris’s interpretation of Florida law 
during the Bush v. Gore controversy was not without legal merit. The 
state law governing the recount procedures was ambiguous, and 
Harris’s contention that it did not require a pre-certification statewide 
manual recount had a plausible textual basis in the pertinent statutes.171 
Moreover, while the pre-election voting purge likely disenfranchised 
qualified Democratic voters, it is also true that a post-election 
investigation by the Miami Herald indicated that thousands of 
 
 166.  See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT 
ELECTION MELTDOWN 21 (2013) (“[W]hile supervising Florida’s 2000 election, Harris also served 
as the cochair of the Bush for President election committee in Florida.”). 
 167.  FOLEY, supra note 164, at 287; HASEN, supra note 166, at 22–28. 
 168.  See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (holding that “it is evident that any recount 
seeking to meet the December 12 date will be unconstitutional” and thus reversing the Florida 
Supreme Court order directing the recount to proceed).  
 169.  See KEYSSAR, supra note 28, at 260 (“Subsequent investigation revealed that 
Republican officials in Florida, anticipating a closely contested election and presuming that most 
ex-felons—as members of minority groups—were likely to vote Democratic, had purchased lists 
of convicted felons from private corporations . . . . [T]he lists of felons were of uncertain accuracy 
and did not contain social security numbers or other reliable identifiers.”); HASEN, supra note 
166, at 29 (“Florida hired an outside company, DBT Online, at a cost of several million dollars to 
manage the voter rolls and purge ineligible felons from those rolls.”). 
 170.  See KEYSSAR, supra note 28, at 260 (noting that the purged voters “were likely to vote 
Democratic” and concluding that “Florida’s broad felon-exclusion laws, thus, had permitted 
partisan state officials in the pursuit of political advantage to deny people their right to vote”); 
HASEN, supra note 166, at 28 (“The purge was done badly: at least two thousand eligible voters 
were removed from the rolls.”); id. at 29 (“Harris’s office was at least reckless in how it let a 
private company conduct the purge.”). 
 171.  FOLEY, supra note 164, at 286–93. 
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ineligible voters cast ballots in the election,172 which showed that the 
voting rolls did indeed need to be updated. But the problem lay in the 
fact that undeniable conflicts of interest tainted every decision that 
Harris made.173 She did not get the benefit of the doubt because she 
gave every indication that she had already made up her mind to rule in 
favor of Bush. Democrats had every right to question the secretary of 
state’s fairness and objectivity when Harris herself appeared to 
embrace the role of a fiercely partisan Republican. 
The Florida 2000 deadlock thus exemplified the undeniable reality 
that partisan officials will never possess the credibility of non-partisan 
election administrators. As Martha Kropf and David Kimball observed 
in their comprehensive 2012 study of American election administration 
practices, “partisan election officials can put their thumb on the scale 
of administration to help their political party. This should be troubling 
to anyone interested in fair elections.”174 Unfortunately the trend is 
toward more partisanship in election administration rather than less. 
For example, in 2016 the Wisconsin legislature abolished the state’s 
nonpartisan Government Accountability Board, which experts had 
hailed as a model for the nation,175 and replaced it with a state election 
commission controlled by partisan appointees.176 
The second way in which partisanship in election administration 
manifests itself is in the state legislatures’ adoption of voting rules that 
benefit one party at the expense of another. The problem stems from 
the United States Constitution itself, which entrusts the legislative 
branch with responsibility for election administration. Article I, Section 
4 states: 
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the Legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations . . .177 
 
 172.  HASEN, supra note 166, at 31. 
 173.  FOLEY, supra note 164, at 287. 
 174.  MARTHA KROPF & DAVID C. KIMBALL, HELPING AMERICA VOTE: THE LIMITS OF 
ELECTION REFORM 114 (2012). 
 175.  See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, America’s Top Model: The Wisconsin Government 
Accountability Board, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 575, 607 (2013) (“The GAB thus serves as a worthy 
model for the remaining forty-nine states, all of which still have partisan or bipartisan chief 
election authorities . . . .”). 
 176.  Scott Bauer, Wisconsin GAB in Final Days as State’s Elections Authority, MILWAUKEE-
WIS. J. SENTINEL (June 26, 2016), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/wisconsin-gab-in-
final-days-as-states-elections-authority-b99751280z1-384455051.html.   
 177.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 4. 
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Although partisans might cite the Constitution as the strongest 
defense of politically-motivated election administration, the historical 
record clearly indicates that the Constitution’s framers did not grasp 
the partisan implications of what they had done in Article I, Section 4. 
At the time of the Constitution, parties in a modern sense did not even 
exist yet.178 In addition the Constitution’s framers expressed a deep 
hostility to partisan factionalism.179 As James Madison warned in 
Federalist No. 10, when factionalism divides a polity, “the public good 
is disregarded” and public policy “is too often decided, not according 
to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the 
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.”180 Likewise, 
in his farewell address, President Washington condemned the “baneful 
effects of the spirit of party,” which he viewed as the “worst enemy” of 
democracy.181 He warned that “[t]he alternate domination of one 
faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party 
dissension” would lead to “horrid enormities” and “a frightful 
despotism.”182 The framers thus structured the Constitution with the 
intent of impeding the rise of political parties.183 
Contrary to the framers’ intentions, however, the Constitution did 
not prevent the rise of large and powerful factions in American 
politics.184 Political parties gradually took shape in the early national 
period,185 which meant that Article I’s assignment of election rules to 
legislatures had sweeping ramifications far beyond what the framers 
envisioned. Legislative control of election rules allowed majority 
 
 178.  See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, 
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 17 (2005) (“Nothing resembling the 
modern party system had yet emerged as an historical reality.”). 
 179.  See id. at 17 (“[The Founders] equated parties with factions, which they saw as evils.”). 
 180.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 41–42 (James Madison) (Mary Carolyn Waldrep & Jim 
Miller eds., 2014). 
 181.  George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), reprinted in SPEECHES OF THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 17, 21 (Janet Podell & Steven Anzovin eds., 2d ed. 2001).  
 182.  Id.  
 183.  See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 713 (1998) (citation omitted) (“[T]he constitutional 
structure was specifically intended to preclude the rise of political parties, which were considered 
the quintessential form of ‘faction.’”). 
 184.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 180, at 84 (stating that the Constitution was 
designed to ensure that “[t]he influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their 
particular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States”). 
 185.  See JOHN F. HOADLEY, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: 1789-1803 7 
(2015) (“The period from 1789 to 1803 witnessed dramatic events that can only be adequately 
described as a process of party development, a process that was remarkable for its swift 
appearance during an era when the idea of parties was greatly feared.”). 
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parties in the state legislatures to draft laws with the implicit goal of 
denying their political opponents access to the ballot box. Jim Crow 
segregation is a case in point. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the southern Democratic Party adopted a series of 
disenfranchising laws—including poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and 
literacy tests—designed to deny the right to vote to African Americans, 
who were politically aligned with the Republican Party.186 The voting 
restrictions were highly effective at severely curtailing black suffrage 
rights. For example, the number of registered African American voters 
in Louisiana fell from 130,000 in 1896 to 1,342 by 1904.187 Not until the 
adoption of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, which invalidated racially 
discriminatory voting laws, would African American registration rates 
in the South begin to rival rates among whites.188 For example, between 
1965 and 2004, African American registration rates in Mississippi rose 
from 6.7% to 72.3%.189 By closely scrutinizing and policing the voting 
rules that emanated from partisan southern legislatures, the VRA 
proved highly effective at creating a truly biracial democracy in the 
South.190 As Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged in Shelby County v. 
Holder, the VRA was “immensely successful at redressing racial 
discrimination and integrating the voting process” in the South.191 
But in recent years, the parties have once again been aggressive in 
utilizing their control of election administration. Partisan redistricting 
is the most obvious example.192 Article I, Section 2 of the United States 
Constitution provides that congressional districts must be redrawn 
every 10 years,193 and the states follow the same pattern for legislative 
districts. Since the earliest days of the American republic, the parties 
 
 186.  KEYSSAR, supra note 28, at 66–69, 84–93. 
 187.  Id. at 91. 
 188.  Id. at 212. 
 189.  See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626 (2013). 
 190.  See id. at 2625 (citation omitted) (“Nearly 50 years later, things have changed 
dramatically . . . . ‘[V]oter turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly 
discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at 
unprecedented levels.’”). 
 191.  Id. at 2626. 
 192.  See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of 
Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1661–62 (1993) (“[P]arties in power can enhance their 
electoral opportunities by displacing incumbents of the other party from their established 
constituents, thus denying the displaced incumbents the benefits obtained from name recognition, 
past delivery of constituent services, and prior social investment in the district.”); ROYCE 
CROCKER, CONG. RES. SERV., R42831, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: AN OVERVIEW 5 
(2012) (“By concentrating more like-minded voters into fewer districts with super-majorities, . . . 
the group of like-minded voters will be able to elect fewer of their preferred candidates.”). 
 193.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  
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have drawn district lines in a manner that maximizes the votes of the 
incumbent party.194 The term “gerrymander”—which refers to 
politically-motivated redistricting—originated with Massachusetts 
Governor Elbridge Gerry, a skilled practitioner of partisan redistricting 
in the early 1800s.195 Gerrymandering is deeply unpopular with the 
public. A 2013 Harris Poll found that only 2% of Americans support 
the idea of state legislatures drawing their own district lines and 50% 
support the use of independent commissions.196 Popular opposition to 
gerrymandering is understandable. After all, what sense does it make 
to allow partisans to choose their own districts? The central idea of 
democracy is that the voters choose their leaders, not the other way 
around.197 But when partisans control the redistricting process, 
incumbent legislators choose the voters who are assigned to their 
districts. 
Despite its undemocratic nature, gerrymandering is an entrenched 
feature of most American elections. Only a handful of states use 
independent commissions to draw district lines and one state—Iowa—
assigns redistricting responsibility to a nonpartisan legislative 
bureau.198 In 43 of the 50 states, the legislature controls the redistricting 
process.199 Although the Supreme Court has held that political 
gerrymandering may give rise to equal protection claims under the 
Fourteenth Amendment,200 the court has not yet agreed on a judicially 
manageable standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering 
claims.201 Consequently, partisan redistricting remains the law of the 
 
 194.  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274 (2004) (plurality opinion) (noting that 
politically-motivated redistricting could be dated as far back as colonial Pennsylvania in the early 
1700s). 
 195.  See MARK E. RUSH, DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 2 (1993) (“The term 
gerrymander was first used in 1812 when the Democratic-Republican (i.e., Jeffersonian) majority 
of the Massachusetts legislature split Essex County in order to dilute the strength of the 
Federalists.”). 
 196.  Americans Across Party Lines Oppose Common Gerrymandering Practices, HARRIS 
POLL (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.theharrispoll.com/politics/Americans_Across_Party_ 
Lines_Oppose_Common_Gerrymandering_Practices.html.  
 197.  See How to Rig an Election, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 25, 2002), 
http://www.economist.com/node/1099030 (“In a normal democracy, voters choose their 
representatives. In America, it is rapidly becoming the other way around . . . .”). 
 198.  CROCKER, supra note 192, at 16–18. 
 199.  Id. at 16.  
 200.  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (“[W]e hold that political gerrymandering 
cases are properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 201.  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[N]o judicially 
discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have 
emerged.”). 
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land in the great majority of states and is employed by both parties. 
Moreover, sophisticated data mining methods have made 
gerrymandering more potent than ever.202 
Besides gerrymandering, partisan elected officials also dictate the 
rules that govern voting procedures. Such power may seem mundane, 
but it has enormous practical significance. In both federal and state 
elections, partisan officials set voter registration requirements, maintain 
and purge voter rolls, and select polling sites and hours of operation.203 
Everything that goes into voting is thus controlled by political 
operators who have a vested interest in the outcome of the election. 
The Trump Administration has made clear that it intends to make 
full use of partisan control of election administration. After taking 
office in January 2017, President Trump established a presidential 
commission for a “major investigation” of voter fraud,204 expressed 
skepticism about early voting,205 and pledged a “full evaluation of 
voting rolls.”206 Following the administration’s lead, legislatures in 
twenty-seven states are considering new voting restrictions in 2017.207 
For example, in Iowa, the Republican-controlled legislature announced 
 
 202.  See Daley, supra note 22 (explaining that the Republican Party “was also able to take 
advantage of massive new amounts of public data drawn from social media that allowed them to 
pinpoint likely voters with more accuracy than ever before, and advances in mapping technology 
that made it possible to redraw districts precisely around the location of those voters”); 2012 
REDMAP Summary Report, supra note 22.  
 203.  BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., NEW VOTING RESTRICTIONS IN PLACE FOR 2016 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.brennancenter.org/voting-restrictions-
first-time-2016; Strawbridge Robinson, supra note 19. 
 204.  Alan Yuhas, Pence to Head Commission Investigating Baseless Voter Fraud Claim, 
Trump Says, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/05/ 
donald-trump-mike-pence-commission-voter-fraud; Rebecca Savransky, Trump to Ask for 
‘Major Investigation into Voter Fraud,’ HILL (Jan. 25, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/ 
administration/316006-trump-to-ask-for-major-investigation-into-voter-fraud; Josh Gerstein, 
Trump’s Call for Election-fraud Probe Fraught with Peril, POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2017), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-voter-fraud-234183.  
 205.  Ben Kamisar, Trump Questions Merits of Early Voting, HILL (Dec. 9, 2016), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/309738-trump-questions-merits-of-early-voting.  
 206.  Mike DeBonis, In Private Meeting, Pence Vows ‘Full Evaluation of Voting Rolls’ over 
Claims of Fraud, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/in-
private-meeting-pence-vows-full-evaluation-of-voting-rolls-over-claims-of-voting-fraud/2017 
/01/27/1c1fa1de-e49a-11e6-a547-5fb9411d332c_story.html?utm_term=.14f42954b55d 
&wpisrc=al_alert-COMBO-politics%252Bnation; Jenna Johnson & David Nakamura, Trump to 
Sign Executive Order Related to Voter Fraud, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/26/trump-to-sign-executive-
order-related-to-voter-fraud/?utm_term=.ae1f30e6a3b3&wpisrc=nl_politics-pm&wpmm=1; Ben 
Jacobs & Sam Levin, Mike Pence: Trump Administration Planning ‘Full Evaluation’ of Voter 
Fraud, GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/ jan/26/trump-
administration-voter-fraud-investigation-mike-pence.  
 207.  VOTING LAWS ROUNDUP 2017, supra note 17.  
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plans to adopt a new voter ID law even though the state’s top election 
official has declared that voter fraud is not a problem in Iowa.208 In 
addition, Republican secretaries of state across the country have 
indicated that they will engage in a major review of voting rolls to purge 
ineligible voters in preparation for the 2018 election.209 Meanwhile, 
former President Barack Obama and former Attorney General Eric 
Holder have announced that they will campaign to help Democrats 
control the redistricting process following the 2020 Census.210 The battle 
for control of election administration is thus certain to escalate in the 
years ahead.   
To date, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld partisan 
control of election administration, even in highly controversial 
contexts. For example, in Crawford v. Marion County,211 the Court 
upheld Indiana’s strict photo identification law on grounds that the 
state’s legitimate interest in protecting election integrity remained 
valid despite the fact that “partisan considerations may have played a 
significant role in the decision to enact” the law.212 And in the 2013 
Shelby County case, the Supreme Court struck down the VRA’s 
preclearance formula,213 clearing the way for partisan legislatures in the 
South and other previously covered jurisdictions to reassert their 
control over voting rules. 
Partisan control of election administration is thus a long-standing 
and deeply entrenched problem in American history, one with its 
origins in the Constitution itself and one that has gone largely 
unchallenged by the Supreme Court. But in the toxic atmosphere of 
contemporary politics, partisan control of election administration is 
more dangerous than ever. In a time of hyperpolarization and pervasive 
 
 208.  Rod Boshart, Iowa Secretary of State Pate Refutes Claims of Rigged Election: Calls 
Iowa’s System Fair, Honest, CEDAR RAPIDS GAZETTE, (Oct. 17, 2016), 
http://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/government/elections/iowa-secretary-of-state-pate-
refutes-claims-of-rigged-election-20161017; David Weigel, Despite Few Reports of Election 
Fraud, Iowa GOP Moving Ahead on Voter ID Law, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/06/despite-few-reports-of-
election-fraud-iowa-gop-moving-ahead-on-voter-
id/?utm_term=.d70eedb7ecfc&wpisrc=nl_politics-pm&wpmm=1.  
 209.  Robinson, supra note 203. 
 210.  Edward-Isaac Dovere, Obama, Holder to Lead Post-Trump Redistricting Campaign, 
POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/obama-holder-redistricting-
gerrymandering-229868. 
 211.  553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 212.  Id. at 203. 
 213.  See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (“The formula in that section can 
no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.”). 
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fears of voter fraud, the anti-democratic risk posed by partisan election 
administration is all too real. 
II.  THE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES 
The 2016 election made clear that American democracy is in 
trouble. Historic levels of hyperpolarization are undermining 
democratic norms and encouraging partisans to view their opponents 
as a threat to the nation. Meanwhile, declining public confidence in 
election fairness coupled with partisan manipulation of the system is 
building momentum for stricter voting regulations, which in turn 
heightens the threat of voter disenfranchisement. The result is America 
runs the risk of becoming an illiberal democracy, one in which the 
incumbent party uses its control of election administration to 
disenfranchise just enough supporters of the opposition party to keep 
the incumbent party in power indefinitely. 
A.  Eroded Public Confidence in Election Integrity 
Historically, one of the great stabilizing features of American 
democracy is the fact that losing presidential candidates have a long 
tradition of accepting defeat gracefully. The 1960 election is a prime 
example. When John Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon in the 
exceptionally close presidential election that year, Nixon suspected 
that Kennedy may have owed his narrow victory to election fraud in 
Illinois and Texas.214 Nixon’s suspicion may have had at least some basis 
in fact. Scholars who have examined the historical record have 
concluded that Kennedy supporters may indeed have stuffed ballot 
boxes in Illinois and Texas.215 Nevertheless, keenly aware of the fact that 
he was unlikely to prove definitively that fraud cost him the election, 
Nixon declined to challenge Kennedy’s victory.216 As Nixon later 
explained, “A presidential recount would require up to half a year, 
during which time the legitimacy of Kennedy’s election would be in 
question. . . . I could not subject the country to such a situation.”217 
Nixon’s display of statesmanship spared the nation a divisive and 
destructive dispute over the 1960 election results. 
Similarly, when the Supreme Court ordered an end to the Florida 
recount in the 2000 election, Al Gore accepted defeat and issued a 
 
 214.  RICHARD MILHOUS NIXON, RN: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 224 (1978).  
 215.  FOLEY, supra note 164, at 218–24. 
 216.  STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE EDUCATION OF A POLITICIAN 606 (1987). 
 217.  NIXON, supra note 214, at 224. 
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strong endorsement of the democratic process.218 Gore urged his fellow 
Democrats to accept the Court’s decision in order to reaffirm 
America’s democratic institutions.219 As Gore explained in a 
nationally-televised concession speech, it was critically necessary for 
Democrats to accept the legitimacy of Bush’s victory “for the sake of 
our unity as a people and the strength of our democracy.”220 
But the tradition of candidates honoring democratic norms ended 
in dramatic fashion in 2016 when the winner of the presidential election 
falsely claimed to be a victim of massive voter fraud.221 Although late 
night comedians ridiculed Trump for the absurd nature of his claims,222 
the president’s allegations dealt an extremely serious blow to public 
confidence in America’s democratic institutions. As the Washington 
Post observed, Trump’s false allegation of widespread voter fraud 
“spread like a virus” across the country.223 Despite the fact that he 
offered no evidence, Trump’s supporters believed his allegation that the 
Democrats attempted to rig the election against him.224 A December 
2016 Economist/YouGov poll found that a staggering 62 percent of 
Trump voters believed that millions of illegal votes were cast during the 
election.225 The Economist/YouGov poll was consistent with polling 
taken during the fall campaign when Trump began his attacks on the 
integrity of the election system. A September 2016 Washington Post-
 
 218.  See FOLEY, supra note 164, at 279–305; HASEN, supra note 166, at 11–40 (describing the 
Bush-Gore Florida deadlock). 
 219.  Richard L. Berke & Katharine Q. Seelye, The 43rd President: The Vice President; Bush 
Pledges To Be President For ‘One Nation,’ Not One Party; Gore, Conceding, Urges Unity, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/14/us/43rd-president-vice-president-
bush-pledges-be-president-for-one-nation-not-one.html.  
 220.  Id. 
 221.  See supra Section I.A.  
 222.  E.g., Kristine Phillips, Colbert Mocks Bannon, Miller, Other Trump Aides: ‘It’s a Rough 
Time for the Stephen Community,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2017/02/18/colbert-mocks-bannon-miller-other-trump-aides-its-
a-rough-time-for-the-stephen-community/?utm_term=.1e88f0acf49e; Megan McCluskey, Watch 
Seth Meyers Slam Trump Advisor Stephen Miller’s ‘Deranged’ Voter Fraud Claims, TIME (Feb. 
14, 2017), http://time.com/4670443/seth-meyers-stephen-miller-voter-fraud/. 
 223.  Jenna Johnson, The Tale of a Trump Falsehood: How His Voter Fraud Claim Spread 
Like a Virus, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-tale-of-
a-trump-falsehood-how-his-voter-fraud-claim-spread-like-a-virus/2017/01/30/47081e32-e4ed-
11e6-ba11-63c4b4fb5a63_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-low_falseweek-7a%3Ahomepage 
%2Fstory&utm_term=.c10c24886368. 
 224.  Kait Richmond & Tatianna Amatruda, Why Trump Supporters Stand by Debunked 
Claim, CNN (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/01/politics/donald-trump-supporters-
check-in-camerota-new-day-cnntv/.  
 225.  The Economist/YouGov Poll, supra note 5, at 61; Kathy Frankovic, Belief in 
Conspiracies Largely Depends on Political Identity, YOUGOV (Dec. 27, 2016), 
https://today.yougov.com/news/2016/12/27/belief-conspiracies-largely-depends-political-iden/. 
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ABC News poll found that 46 percent of Americans, and 69 percent of 
Trump voters, believed that voter fraud occurs often.226 Likewise, an 
October 2016 Politico/Morning Consult poll found that 73 percent of 
Republicans believed that Democrats might steal the election from 
Trump through voter fraud.227 Trump’s Electoral College victory did 
not allay his supporters’ concerns. A December 2016 Washington Post 
poll found that half of all Republicans believed that Trump actually 
won the popular vote228 despite the official certified results to the 
contrary.229 
It was not just Trump supporters who expressed doubts about the 
integrity of the election results. Jill Stein’s allegations and public 
confusion over the nature of the Russian intervention in the election—
which the FBI concluded involved hacking of DNC emails, not hacking 
of voting tallies—undermined Democratic voters’ confidence in the 
integrity of the 2016 election. In December 2016, the 
Economist/YouGov poll found that 50 percent of Clinton voters 
believed that the Russian government manipulated voting tallies to rig 
the election in favor of Trump.230 A post-election poll also found that 
one-third of Clinton supporters viewed Trump’s victory as 
“illegitimate.”231 Irrespective of party, therefore, doubts about the 
integrity of the election system are broad, deep, and growing. For 
example, an October 2016 PRRI poll found that a large majority of 
 
 226.  Washington Post-ABC News Poll (Sept. 5–8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
page/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2016/09/15/National-Politics/Polling/question_17201.xml 
?uuid=kmJFjnszEeaAZMHdyKckuw; Emily Guskin & Scott Clement, Poll: Nearly Half of 
Americans Say Voter Fraud Occurs Often, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/09/15/poll-nearly-half-of-americans-say-
voter-fraud-occurs-often/?utm_term=.cadf5479eeec.  
 227.  Jake Sherman & Steven Shepard, Poll: 41 Percent of Voters Say Election Could be 
‘Stolen’ from Trump, POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/poll-41-
percent-of-voters-say-the-election-could-be-stolen-from-trump-229871. A September 2016 poll 
found that almost 50 percent of Americans believe that voter fraud occurs routinely. See Guskin 
& Clement, supra note 226. 
 228.  Rachael Revesz, Half of Republicans Incorrectly Believe Donald Trump Won the 
Popular Vote, Poll Shows, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 18, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ 
world/americas/donald-trump-online-poll-half-republicans-believe-candidate-won-popular-vote-
conspiracy-theories-a7482966.html.  
 229.  AP Fact Check: How do Trump’s Voter Fraud Allegations Hold Up?, PBS NEWSHOUR: 
THE RUNDOWN (Nov. 29, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown /ap-fact-check-trumps-
voter-fraud-allegations-hold/.  
 230.  The Economist/YouGov Poll, supra note 5, at 62; Frankovic, supra note 225.  
 230.  Washington Post-ABC News Poll, supra note 226.  
 231.  Scott Clement, One-third of Clinton Supporters Say Trump Election is Not Legitimate, 
Poll Finds, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2016/11/13/one-third-of-clinton-supporters-say-trump-election-is-not-legitimate-poll-
finds/?utm_term=.36d3ddc04661.  
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Americans feared that America’s democratic process has been 
compromised, with 41 percent fearing voter suppression and 37 percent 
fearing voter fraud.232 
The 2016 poll results were deeply disturbing. The legitimacy and 
stability of democratic government depends on the public’s confidence 
that votes are tabulated honestly and accurately.233 But the latest survey 
results indicate that the public has lost faith in election integrity, a 
profoundly disquieting development that raises fundamental questions 
about the future of American democracy. As the Commission on 
Federal Election Reform has warned, “Democracy is endangered when 
people believe that their votes do not matter or are not counted 
correctly.”234 
In an era of hyperpolarization and short attention spans brought on 
by 24-hour news cycles, it is easy to underestimate the corrosive effects 
of false allegations that the election system is rigged. After all, the sad 
reality is Americans have grown accustomed to extremely harsh 
political rhetoric. Even the United States Senate, a traditional paragon 
of decorum, has seen a precipitous decline in civility among its 
members.235 The loss of civility and decency in public discourse extends 
beyond the political world and reflects a broader coarsening of 
American culture. A nationwide survey in 2014 found that over 90 
percent of Americans believe that incivility in America is a problem 
and over 60 percent believe that it has risen to “crisis levels.”236 Thus, 
when the president makes false claims that his opponents have 
perpetrated massive voter fraud, one might be inclined to rationalize 
the significance of such remarks as just another example of the harsh 
and hyperbolic culture of early twenty-first century America. 
 
 
 
 232.  Russonello, supra note 5.  
 233.  Lonna Rae Atkeson, Voter Confidence in 2010: Local, State, and National Factors, in 
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: THE STATE OF REFORM AFTER BUSH V. 
GORE 102, 103 (R. Michael Alvarez & Bernard Grofman eds., 2014). 
 234.  COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS 1 
(Sept. 2005), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/AssetManager/Exhibit%20M.pdf.  
 235.  On the decline in civility in the Senate during her decades in Washington, see the recent 
speech by Maine Senator Susan Collins at the University of Maine, Senator Susan Collins, 
Keynote Address on Hyperpartisanship in Wash. at the Univ. of Me. (Apr. 3, 2015), 
https://www.collins.senate.gov/newsroom/senator-collins-addresses-hyperpartisanship-
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 236.  WEBER SHANDWICK, CIVILITY IN AMERICA 2014 3 (2014), http://www.webershand 
wick.com/uploads/news/files/civility-in-america-2014.pdf.  
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But minimizing false claims of election fraud would be a mistake, 
particularly when it is the president who has played a key role in 
propagating the baseless allegations. Trump’s claims regarding the 
“rigged” 2016 election represent a stunning departure from historical 
and democratic norms. His cynical and reckless tactics suggest the 
nation has crossed a line in which anything now goes in political 
discourse. If even the president feels no obligation to exercise caution 
and restraint when discussing the integrity of America’s democratic 
institutions, who else will? The president’s lack of self-control in his 
public comments about the election system is particularly alarming at 
a time when the internet is already facilitating the rapid spread of fake 
news and when hyperpolarization is promoting dangerous levels of 
animosity between Republicans and Democrats. 
Consequently, we have reached a disturbing turning point. 
Confidence in the nation’s democratic institutions was once a central 
theme of American history. In an 1862 address, Abraham Lincoln 
described American democracy as “the last best hope of earth.”237 In 
1917 Woodrow Wilson declared that America would help make the 
world “safe for democracy.”238 And in 2001 President George W. Bush 
proclaimed, “Ours is the greatest democracy in the world.”239 But today 
the public doubts whether we even have an honest and functional 
democracy. If the voters lose faith in their democratic institutions, they 
may well lose faith in the concept of democracy itself. 
Public cynicism about election integrity is dangerous for another 
reason. The United States is not a nation founded on a common racial, 
ethnic, or religious identity. It is founded instead on the pluralistic 
principles of liberal democracy, which include a shared national 
commitment to the rule of law and the democratic process. Public 
confidence in the vitality and integrity of our democratic institutions is 
one of the key ties that bind Americans of diverse backgrounds 
together. 
The public’s loss of faith in the integrity of the election system thus 
strikes at the heart of both American democracy and Americans’ 
 
 237.  Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in 5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 537 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1983). 
 238.  Address to a Joint Session of Congress (April 2, 1917), in 41 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW 
WILSON 525 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1983). 
 239.  Interview with George W. Bush, with AM. SOC’Y OF NEWSPAPER EDS. (Apr. 5, 2001), 
in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=45678&st 
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shared sense of national identity. It also potentially sets the stage for a 
significant new effort to erode voting rights under the pretext of 
restoring election integrity. 
B.  Abridged Voting Rights 
To understand the controversy over voting rights, it is crucial to 
understand the current political landscape. A razor’s edge separates the 
two major parties. In the 2016 election Donald Trump won the 
Electoral College by 304 votes to 227 for Hillary Clinton.240 But Clinton 
won the popular vote by nearly 3 million votes, and Trump’s Electoral 
College victory was contingent upon his narrow victories in Michigan, 
Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania.241 Trump’s margins in each state were 
exceedingly close: a 10,000 vote margin in Michigan out of 4.8 million 
votes cast (a 0.2% victory margin), a 22,000 vote margin in Wisconsin 
out of 3 million votes cast (a 0.7 % victory margin), and a 44,000 vote 
margin in Pennsylvania (a 0.7% victory margin) out of 6.1 million votes 
cast. Thus, out of 136 million ballots cast in the presidential election 
overall, the outcome was decided by 76,000 votes in just three states.242 
Congressional elections are similarly divided. In the 2016 House 
elections, Republicans won the popular vote by 1.3 million votes out of 
128 million cast,243 a margin of only 1%. 
In a nation where victory margins are so narrow, the temptation to 
use election administration to promote a small but significant 
difference in election outcomes is powerful. In recent years, two areas 
of election law in particular have become flashpoints of political 
controversy. The first is the redistricting process; the second is the 
adoption of strict voter identification requirements and other laws that 
place new burdens on the effort to vote. 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that partisan 
gerrymandering threatens the constitutional rights of voters under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.244 The reason is because politically-motivated 
redistricting dilutes the voting strength of the party out of power. In 
 
 240.  Kiersten Schmidt & Wilson Andrews, A Historic Number of Electors Defected, and Most 
Were Supposed to Vote for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2016/12/19/us/elections/electoral-college-results.html?_r=0.  
 241.  Wasserman, supra note 82.  
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id.  
 244.  See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (“[W]e hold that political 
gerrymandering cases are properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
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Reynolds v. Sims,245 the Supreme Court observed that “the right of 
suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a 
citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free 
exercise of the franchise.”246 For example, the incumbent party may 
draw district lines to pack a single district with the minority party’s 
voters, thus leading to many wasted votes, or it may spread the minority 
party’s voters thinly across many districts, minimizing their voting 
power on election day. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that partisan gerrymanders “are incompatible with 
democratic principles.”247 
The constitutional implications of gerrymandering are most 
obvious in the context of race.248 The Supreme Court has made clear 
that redistricting practices that dilute the votes of minority voters are 
impermissible.249 In the March 2017 case of Bethune-Hill v. Virginia 
State Board of Elections,250 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the 
“Equal Protection Clause prohibits a State, without sufficient 
justification, from ‘separat[ing] its citizens into different voting districts 
on the basis of race.’”251 The Court further noted that “even when a 
reapportionment plan respects traditional principles” of redistricting—
such as compactness and contiguity—it may still violate the equal 
protection clause if racial considerations were the state’s predominant 
motivation in drawing the lines.252 Bethune-Hill reinforces the Supreme 
Court’s commitment to scrutinizing and policing instances of racial 
gerrymandering. 
 
 245.  377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 246.  Id. at 555. 
 247.  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 316 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
 248.  On the dilution of the votes of minority voters, see Heather K. Gerken, Understanding 
the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2001). Gerken explains that in a racial 
polarized electorate, “[a] state could take advantage of this type of voting pattern by drawing 
district lines that give whites a majority in a disproportionate share of districts, thus ensuring that 
minority voters are unable to elect a candidate of their choice. Section 2 protects minority voters 
from this type of injury, which we call ‘vote dilution,’ by requiring states to draw district lines that 
offer racial minorities a fair chance to elect their candidates of choice.” Id. at 1666. 
 249.  See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (“The essence of a § 2 claim is that a 
certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause 
an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred 
representatives.”); see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (holding that a state may not 
“segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race” absent “sufficient 
justification”); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (“[A State] may not separate its citizens 
into different voting districts on the basis of race.”). 
 250.  NO. 15-680, 2017 WL 774194 (Mar. 1, 2017). 
 251.  Id. at *7 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 911). 
 252.  Id. at *8.  
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However, the Supreme Court has not yet agreed on a standard for 
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering cases.253 In the 2004 case of Vieth 
v. Jubelirer, a plurality of justices warned that if the courts adjudicated 
partisan gerrymandering cases without agreed upon objective 
redistricting standards, judges would find themselves cast “forth upon 
a sea of imponderables” and forced “to make determinations that not 
even election experts can agree upon.”254 The plurality thus concluded 
that the Constitution does not provide “a judicially enforceable limit 
on the political considerations that the States and Congress may take 
into account when districting.”255 
The Supreme Court’s inability to ascertain a judicially-manageable 
redistricting standard has permitted partisan gerrymandering to 
continue unabated across the country. Although the extent to which 
gerrymandering actually affects election outcomes is hotly debated by 
scholars,256 it is telling that the elected officials who do the line-drawing 
clearly assume that it does matter. Recent elections support that 
assumption. For example, because Republicans won sweeping victories 
in state legislative races across the country in 2010, they were able to 
draw district lines for four times as many House seats as were 
Democratic-controlled legislatures.257 The Republican gerrymandering 
following the 2010 Census was so successful that in 2012 Republicans 
won a 33-seat House majority despite losing the popular vote 
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 255.  Id. at 305. 
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Matter?, in RED AND BLUE NATION?: CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S 
POLARIZED POLITICS 263, 268–69 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006). 
 257.  Anthony J. Gaughan, To End Gerrymandering: The Canadian Model for Reforming the 
Congressional Redistricting Process in the United States, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 999, 1034 (2013); see 
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATORS, REPUBLICANS EXCEED EXPECTATIONS IN 2010 STATE 
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/press-room/republicans-exceed-
expectations-in-2010.aspx. 
GAUGHAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2017  11:44 AM 
2017] ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 99 
nationwide in House elections by nearly 1.4 million votes.258 The 2016 
House elections demonstrated that the 2011 redistricting continues to 
benefit Republican candidates. The Republicans’ narrow 1% margin in 
the popular vote in 2016 translated to a landslide congressional victory 
as the Republicans carried 241 House seats to 194 for the Democrats.259 
In other words, thanks to partisan gerrymandering, winning 49% of the 
vote translated to over 55% of the seats. Thus, while scholars may be 
uncertain as to the precise extent to which gerrymandering impacts 
congressional and legislative races, experienced politicians have made 
no secret of their conviction that it is a critical tool for gaining partisan 
advantage on election day. As Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes 
have explained, “procedural [election] rules affect politicians directly, 
and politicians have particular expertise in the ways these rules affect 
their interests.”260 
Technological developments suggest that partisan gerrymandering 
will become even more effective in future redistricting cycles. The 
growing sophistication of big data analytics gives legislatures 
extraordinary detail regarding the likely partisan voting patterns of 
particular neighborhoods.261 Moreover, computer-assisted line drawing 
enables the party that controls redistricting a degree of precision 
unimaginable in previous eras.262 It is with good reason therefore that 
former President Barack Obama and former Attorney General Eric 
Holder  have  identified  breaking  the  Republican  hold  over  political  
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redistricting as essential to making House elections competitive 
again.263 
But the anti-democratic consequences of partisan gerrymandering 
pale in comparison to the threat posed by partisan control of voting 
regulations. Gerrymandering may dilute votes, but it does not deny 
access to voting. Partisan control of voting qualifications and election 
day procedures, however, poses a significant risk of disenfranchisement. 
The leading example is the battle over strict voter identification laws. 
In the aftermath of the Bush v. Gore election controversy in 2000, a 
federal commission led by former President Jimmy Carter and former 
Secretary of State James Baker proposed a series of election reforms, 
including a proposal to require voters to show photo identification.264 
Shortly thereafter, Republican legislatures across the country adopted 
new voter ID laws that they described as necessary to modernize the 
election system, prevent fraud, and safeguard voter confidence in the 
election system’s integrity.265 Georgia and Indiana set the pattern when 
they adopted strict voter ID laws that required voters to produce a 
government-approved form of photographic identification.266 
Critics, however, argue that strict photo identification laws 
disenfranchise poor and minority voters.267 The debate over voter ID 
laws has set off one of the most acrimonious disputes in the modern 
history of American election law. As Daniel Tokaji has observed, “With 
heated allegations of voter suppression coming from one side and 
equally heated allegations of voter fraud from the other, it has become 
difficult even to discuss the most important election administration  
questions of the day civilly--much less to run elections in a manner that 
engenders public confidence.”268 
 
 
 263.  Alexander Burns & Jonathan Martin, Eric Holder to Lead Democrats’ Attack on 
Republican Gerrymandering, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/ 
eric-holder-to-lead-democrats-attack-on-republican-gerrymandering.html.  
 264.  COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, supra note 234, at 69, 93. For the full history of 
Voter ID laws, see Joshua A. Douglas, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, in ELECTION 
LAW STORIES 457–73, 498–504 (Joshua A. Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016). 
 265.  HASEN, supra note 166, at 43; see also, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008) (describing the motivations behind Indiana’s voter ID law). 
 266.  NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATORS, HISTORY OF VOTER ID (Apr. 18, 2016), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id-history.aspx.  
 267.  KEYSSAR, supra note 28, at 277 (“Poor and minority communities seemed to be 
particular targets of suppression efforts since their members (especially African Americans) were 
regarded as overwhelmingly likely to vote Democratic.”). 
 268.  Tokaji, supra note 175, at 576–77. 
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The critical question is whether voter identification laws and other 
election rules changes are necessary to preserve election integrity. It is 
undeniably true that a haphazard system characterizes election 
administration practices across the country. The American election 
system is extremely decentralized and many states rely on outdated 
registration and voting machine technologies.269 Despite the fact that 
computers have been a mainstay of accounting practices in the private 
sector for decades, voter records across the country are still maintained 
in paper form.270 The paper-based registration system is susceptible to 
error as well as difficult to update and maintain.271 Republicans thus 
point to voter ID laws as an additional safeguard at a time when 
election administrators across the country rely on outdated 
technologies. Republicans also point out that voter ID laws are highly 
popular with the public. A recent Gallup Poll found that 80 percent of 
Americans—including a large majority of both parties—support voter 
ID laws.272 Irrespective of party, the public clearly views voter ID laws 
as an important measure for maintaining election integrity. 
But is the public right? Are strict voter identification laws 
necessary? The overwhelming weight of the evidence is that the answer 
is no.273 Time and again, allegations of widespread fraud have been 
disproved by academic studies, government investigations, and court 
cases.274 For example, in the most comprehensive study ever 
undertaken, Justin Levitt found only 31 credible incidents of potential 
 
 269.  PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, INACCURATE, COSTLY, AND INEFFICIENT: EVIDENCE THAT 
AMERICA’S VOTER REGISTRATION SYSTEM NEEDS AN UPGRADE 1 (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/pewupgradingvoterregis
trationpdf.pdf.  
 270.  Id. at 2, 3. 
 271.  Id. at 3. 
 272.  Justin McCarthy, Four in Five Americans Support Voter ID Laws, Early Voting, 
GALLUP (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/194741/four-five-americans-support-voter-
laws-early-voting.aspx.  
 273.  See, e.g., Justin Levitt, Election Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted Electoral 
Regulation, 11 ELECTION L.J. 97 (2012).  
 274.  See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., DEBUNKING THE VOTER FRAUD MYTH (Jan. 25, 
2017), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/debunking-voter-fraud-myth; Nate Cohn, Illegal 
Voting Claims, and Why They Don’t Hold Up, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/upshot/illegal-voting-claims-and-why-they-dont-hold-
up.html; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., ELECTIONS: ISSUES RELATED TO STATE VOTER 
IDENTIFICATION LAWS 64–74 (Sep. 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665966.pdf; Philip 
Bump, Here’s How Rare In-person Voter Fraud is, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/08/03/heres-how-rare-in-person-voter-
fraud-is/?utm_term=.e79bf00a5c83; Alan Blinder, Questions and Answers on Voter Fraud, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/us/voter-id-laws-donald-trump.html. 
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voter fraud out of one billion ballots cast between 2000 and 2014.275 
Likewise, a News21 study at Arizona State University found only 10 
cases of in-person voter fraud out of 146 million registered voters276 and 
491 cases of absentee mail-in ballot fraud.277 A five year investigation 
by President George W. Bush’s administration in the early 2000s turned 
up no evidence of widespread voter fraud in federal elections.278 And in 
2016 the Fifth Circuit observed that there were only two convictions for 
in-person voter fraud out of twenty million ballots cast in Texas 
elections in the ten years before the state adopted its photo ID law.279 
The simple reality is in-person voter fraud makes little sense. The 
person who commits it faces enormous risks and receives minimal 
benefits. A single vote is unlikely to change an election result, 
particularly in a federal or statewide election in which hundreds of 
thousands or millions of votes are cast. Individuals have little incentive 
to cast a fraudulent ballot when their vote is highly unlikely to change 
an election outcome.280 Conversely, the criminal consequences of 
engaging in election fraud are severe. Voter fraud is a felony punishable 
by years behind bars. For example, in February 2017 a Texas court 
sentenced a Mexican national to eight years in prison for voting 
illegally in the 2012 and 2014 elections.281 The disincentives to in-person 
voter fraud thus far outweigh any rational benefits that one would 
derive from committing the crime. 
 
 275.  Justin Levitt, A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds 31 Credible 
Incidents out of One Billion Ballots Cast, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehensive-investigation-of-
voter-impersonation-finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballots-cast/?utm_term= 
.f8cb1950f0c0; see also LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD (2010); JUSTIN 
LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE TRUTH ABOUT VOTER FRAUD, (2007), http://www. 
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/The%20Truth%20About%20Voter%20Fraud.pdf.  
 276.  Sami Edge & Sean Holstege, No, Voter Fraud Actually isn’t a Persistent Problem, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/09/01/voter-
fraud-is-not-a-persistent-problem/?utm_term=.e87d2dacbc40; Hope Yen, In-person Voting 
Fraud is Rare, doesn’t Affect Elections, PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (Aug. 20, 2016), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/person-voting-fraud-rare-doesnt-affect-elections/. 
 277.  See Election Fraud in America, NEWS21 (Aug. 12, 2012), http://votingrights.news21.com/ 
interactive/election-fraud-database/ (“The nation has 2,068 cases of alleged election fraud since 
2000. . . . The most prevalent fraud was Absentee Ballot Fraud at 24 percent (491 cases).”). 
 278.  Eric Lipton & Ian Urbina, In 5-Year Effort, Scant Evidence of Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/washington/12fraud.html.  
 279.  Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 238 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 280.  See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 275 (“[F]raud by individual voters is a singularly foolish and 
ineffective way to attempt to win an election.”). 
 281.  Michael Wines, Illegal Voting Gets Texas Woman 8 Years in Prison, and Certain 
Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/us/illegal-voting-
gets-texas-woman-8-years-in-prison-and-certain-deportation.html?_r=0.  
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But even if voter ID laws don’t prevent fraud, do they really harm 
minority voters, and if so, to what extent? A tremendous amount of 
scholarship has attempted to answer that question. The results are 
bitterly contested and no consensus has yet emerged. Some studies 
have found no correlation between voter ID laws and minority 
turnout,282 whereas other studies have found that voter ID laws do have 
a discernible suppressing effect on turnout that disproportionately 
affects minorities.283 For example, an investigation by the Government 
Accountability Office revealed that the adoption of voter ID laws in 
Kansas and Tennessee drove down turnout in those states by 122,000 
votes in the 2012 election.284 The turnout decline primarily consisted of 
fewer younger voters, new voters, and African American voters.285 
A new study using an unusually large and comprehensive data set 
provides the most persuasive evidence that voter ID laws depress 
 
 282.  See, e.g., Rene Rocha & Tetsuya Matsubayashi, The Politics of Race and Voter ID Laws 
in the States: The Return of Jim Crow?, 67 POL. RES. Q. 666, 676 (2014) (finding that “the effect 
of photo ID regulation does not vary by race or ethnicity”); M.V. Hood & Charles S. Bullock, 
Much ado about nothing? An empirical assessment of the Georgia voter identification statute, 12 
ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 394, 409 (2012) (“[A]lthough the law does slightly depress overall turnout, 
this effect does not disproportionately affect racial or ethnic minority groups.”).  
 283.  See, e.g., Reid Wilson, Report: Voter ID Laws Reduce Turnout More Among African 
American and Younger Voters, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/10/09/report-voter-id-laws-reduce-turnout-more-among-african-
american-and-younger-voters/?utm_term=.287883782326 (“Laws requiring voters to show 
identification when they cast a ballot have a greater impact on African Americans and younger 
voters than on other racial and age groups, according to a new analysis.”); Jamelle Bouie, Ahead 
of Trial, Pennsylvania Admits There is no Voter Fraud Problem, WASH. POST (July 24, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/pennsylvania-admits-it-no-voter-fraud-
problem/2012/07/24/gJQAHNVt6W_blog.html?utm_term=.30805f9b7b3a; Bump, supra note 93; 
Matt Barreto, Stephen Nuño & Gabriel Sanchez, The Disproportionate Impact of Voter-ID 
Requirements on the Electorate—New Evidence from Indiana, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 111, 113–
14 (2009); Timothy Vercellotti & David Anderson, Voter-Identification Requirements and the 
Learning Curve, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 117 (2009). 
 284.  Philip Bump, Voter ID Laws in Kansas and Tennessee Dropped 2012 Turnout by over 
100,000 Votes, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2014/10/09/gao-voter-id-laws-in-kansas-and-tennessee-dropped-2012-turnout-by-over-
100000-votes/?utm_term=.4bf4359e3a7b (“Turnout dropped at least 1.9 percentage points in 
Kansas and 2.2 percentage points in Tennessee thanks to the laws. By our calculations, that’s 
122,000 fewer votes.”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., ELECTIONS: ISSUES 
RELATED TO STATE VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS 2 (Sept. 2014), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665966.pdf [hereinafter GAO ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT] 
(finding a 1.9 percent and 2.2 percent drop in Kansas and Tennessee respectively). 
 285.  Bump, supra note 284 (“Young people, black people, and newly registered voters were 
the groups that were more likely to see bigger drops in turnout.”); see also GAO 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 284 (“We estimate that turnout was reduced among 
African-American registrants by 3.7 percentage points more than among Whites in Kansas and 
1.5 percentage points more than among Whites in Tennessee.”). 
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minority turnout.286 In an examination of elections in all 50 states 
during the years 2006 to 2014, Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi, and 
Lindsay Nielson found “substantial drops in minority turnout in strict 
voter ID states and no real changes in white turnout.”287 In general 
elections, the study founded a 7.1% decline in Latino turnout and a 
5.4% decline in Asian American turnout in strict voter ID states.288 
Interestingly, the study suggested that strict voter ID laws had no 
discernible impact on African American or white turnout rates in 
general elections.289 
The difference between black turnout rates and those of other 
minority groups during the 2006-14 period may be explained by the 
special circumstances of the 2008 and 2012 elections. Both elections 
saw African American turnout exceed white turnout for the first time 
in history, including in southern states that had adopted strict Voter ID 
laws.290 Barack Obama, the nation’s first black president, was on the top 
of the Democratic ticket in 2008 and 2012, which undoubtedly 
increased turnout among African American voters. Moreover, Jotaka 
Eaddy, director of voting rights for the NAACP, cited a backlash against 
voter identification laws as a contributing factor in inspiring higher 
levels of black turnout.291 In fact, a study of the 2012 election found that 
turnout increased after voters were informed of strict new voter ID 
laws.292 It seems reasonable to surmise that the presence of Barack 
Obama, the nation’s first African American president, combined with 
a backlash against voter ID laws likely explains the paradoxical 2012 
results.293 
 
 
 286.  Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi & Lindsay Nielson, Voter Identification Laws and the 
Suppression of Minority Votes, 79 J. POL. 363, 368 (2017).  
 287.  Id.  
 288.  Id.  
 289.  See id. (“For blacks, the gap is negligible in general elections but a full 4.6 percentage 
points in primaries.”).  
 290.  Rachel Weiner, Black Voters Turned out at Higher Rate than White Voters in 2012 and 
2008, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/04/29/ 
black-turnout-was-higher-than-white-turnout-in-2012-and-2008/?utm_term=.5df8973d13ed; see 
also Anthony J. Gaughan, Has the South Changed? Shelby County and the Expansion of the Voter 
ID Battlefield, 19 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 109, 130–34 (2013). 
 291.  Gaughan, supra note 290, at 135–36. 
 292.  See Jack Citrin, Donald Green & Morris Levy, The Effects of Voter ID Notification on 
Voter Turnout: Results from a Large-scale Field Experiment, 13 ELECTION L.J. 228, 235 (2014) 
(“Turnout in the Warning condition was . . . approximately one percentage point higher than in 
the control group, which runs counter to the conjecture that warnings about the need for proper 
identification demobilize voters.”). 
 293.  Gaughan, supra note 290, at 134–36.  
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But a backlash can only be sustained for so long, and it is no defense 
of restrictive voting regulations that they may occasionally provoke a 
countervailing reaction that diminishes their effects. As Josh Chafetz 
has argued, “even if the backlash thesis is correct—and the evidence 
for it, thus far, is only anecdotal and circumstantial—it serves to 
reinforce, rather than undermine, the partisan valence of the initial 
decision to implement voting restrictions.”294 
Moreover, it is undeniable that African American turnout declined 
across the nation in 2016. Overall, turnout among whites went up, but 
African American turnout fell by somewhere between 5 and 10 
percent.295 In North Carolina the African American share of the 
electorate fell from 23% in 2012 to just under 21% in 2016.296 Although 
preliminary numbers indicate that Latino turnout increased overall 
from 10% of the electorate in 2012 to 11% in 2016,297 it is entirely 
possible the turnout increase would have been even higher without the 
deterrent effect of restrictive voting laws. The 11% Latino share of the 
2016 electorate is still far below their 17% share of the United States 
population overall,298 a data point that supports the findings of the 
Hajnal-Lajevardi-Nielson study that voter ID laws depress Latino 
turnout. 
But even if we assume that restrictive voting laws only have a 
modest impact on turnout, why do the Republicans invest so much 
effort in them? The answer lies in the razor thin margin of American 
elections. Even laws that have only a modest dampening impact on 
voter turnout can have a decisive impact on election results. As Richard 
Hasen has explained, “The best argument against voter identification 
laws is not that they will have a large effect—they most likely won’t—
but  that  such  laws  are  unnecessary  to prevent  voter fraud,  and in a  
 
 294.  See Josh Chafetz, Governing and Deciding Who Governs, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73, 
104–05 n.169 (2015) (further noting that “the backlash, if it exists, is against precisely that 
valence”). 
 295.  Nate Cohn, How the Obama Coalition Crumbled, Leaving an Opening for Trump, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/upshot/how-the-obama-coalition-
crumbled-leaving-an-opening-for-trump.html.  
 296.  Id. 
 297.  JENS MANUEL KROGSTAD & MARK HUGO LOPEZ, PEW RES. CTR., HILLARY CLINTON 
WON LATINO VOTE BUT FELL BELOW 2012 SUPPORT FOR OBAMA (2016), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/29/hillary-clinton-wins-latino-vote-but-falls-
below-2012-support-for-obama/.  
 298.  JENS MANUEL KROGSTAD & MARK HUGO LOPEZ, PEW RES. CTR., HISPANIC 
POPULATION REACHES RECORD 55 MILLION, BUT GROWTH HAS COOLED (2015), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/25/u-s-hispanic-population-growth-surge-cools/.  
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razor-thin election, we cannot dismiss the partisan ramifications of 
disenfranchising even a small number of voters for no good reason.”299 
Even if the effects of voter identification laws and other voting 
restrictions are modest, there is disturbing evidence that the intent is 
discriminatory.300 Many academic studies have concluded that the new 
voting restrictions represent a Republican strategy to mitigate the 
political influence of minority voters aligned with the Democratic 
Party.301 A new study by the political scientists Daniel Biggers and 
Michael Hanmer found that photo ID laws were mostly likely to be 
adopted in red states with large minority populations and in which 
Republicans had recently won control of both the legislature and the 
governor’s office.302 A 2013 study by Keith Bentele and Erin O’Brien 
concluded that “the Republican Party has engaged in strategic 
demobilization efforts” with the result being that “the US, is actually 
changing voting procedures in a racialized and restraining fashion in 
the modern era—‘de-democratization’ along racial lines.”303 Likewise, 
citing the move to adopt photo ID laws in southern states, Nicholas O. 
 
 299.  HASEN, supra note 166, at 88. 
 300.  See Jason Kander, There’s a Reason Trump Keeps Lying about Voter Fraud, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/theres-a-reason-trump-keeps-
lying-about-voter-fraud/2017/01/27/8396adb4-e3ee-11e6-a453-19ec4b3d09ba_story.html?hpid= 
hp_no-name_opinion-card-c%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.b5565b97f6bb (“Today, it’s 
not that some GOP strategists don’t want black people, for example, to vote because they’re black 
— it’s just that they don’t want them to vote because they don’t usually vote for Republicans.”). 
 301.  See William D. Hicks, Seth C. McKee, Mitchell D. Sellers & Daniel A. Smith, A 
Principle or a Strategy? Voter Identification Laws and Partisan Competition in the American States, 
68 POL. RES. Q. 18 (2014). As the study’s authors explain: 
[T]he Republican Party has proved incapable of expanding its appeal among the much 
faster growing minority electorate—which just so happens to exhibit notably lower 
turnout rates vis-à-vis the stagnant non-Hispanic white electorate that is more 
supportive of Republican candidates. Faced with this reality, the GOP appears to have 
opted for coalition maintenance instead of coalition expansion . . . by embracing several 
restrictive voting reforms whose true purpose is to marginally curtail the participation 
of voters typically aligned with the Democratic Party. 
Id. at 29. See also Chafetz, supra note 294, at 104 (“Given the partisan makeup of the state 
governments that created these impositions on the right to vote, it should be no surprise that these 
provisions are most likely to affect groups that tend to vote Democratic.”); MINNITE, supra note 
275, at 89 (stating that the “proliferation of unsupported fraud allegations” served to “veil a 
political strategy for winning elections by tamping down turnout among socially subordinate 
groups”); Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)Trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH U. L. REV. 553, 556 
(2015) (“[S]tates have increasingly enacted stricter election regulations, supposedly in the name 
of ‘election integrity,’ but more likely to gain partisan advantage for the ruling party.”). 
 302.  Daniel R. Biggers & Michael J. Hanmer, Understanding the Adoption of Voter 
Identification Laws in the American States, 45 AMER. POL. RES. (forthcoming 2017), 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1532673X16687266. 
 303.  Keith G. Bentele & Erin E. O’Brien, Jim Crow 2.0? Why States Consider and Adopt 
Restrictive Voter Access Policies, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 1088, 1089, 1090 (2013). 
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Stephanopoulos has observed, “Republicans’ political incentives point 
unambiguously toward the enactment of additional franchise 
restrictions.”304 The numbers would certainly seem to support such 
conclusions. For example, it is a striking fact that in the primarily 
Republican-controlled jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act’s 
preclearance formula prior to the 2013 Shelby County decision, there 
were 868 fewer polling places in 2016 than 2012, with the impact felt 
most heavily in minority voting precincts.305 
It is not just academic studies that find a partisan motive at work in 
the new voting restrictions. The federal courts have increasingly 
described the Republicans’ primary goal as to disenfranchise enough 
Democratic-supporting minority voters to tip a close election in the 
Republicans favor. For example, in July 2016, a federal judge concluded 
that the Wisconsin legislature’s restriction of in-person absentee voting 
was intended “to suppress the reliably Democratic vote of Milwaukee’s 
African Americans.”306 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit pointedly noted 
that the election law changes adopted by the Republican-controlled 
North Carolina legislature “target African Americans with almost 
surgical precision.”307 
North Carolina provides a disturbing case study of partisan efforts 
to make it harder for minorities to vote.308 The day after the Supreme 
Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder, which struck down 
the VRA’s preclearance formula, the Republican-controlled North 
Carolina legislature announced its plan to implement sweeping 
election law changes.309 Before adopting the new law, the Republican 
 
 304.  Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 55, 60 
(2013). 
 305.  THE LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, THE GREAT POLL CLOSURE 4 ( 2016), 
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/2016/poll-closure-report-web.pdf; see also Dana Milbank, 
The Election Really Was Rigged, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/the-election-really-was-rigged/2016/11/29/c2ed58d8-b666-11e6-a677-b608fbb3aaf6_ 
story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.594e8a7b3862 (describing increased incentive to suppress a 
growing minority vote).  
 306.  One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, No. 15-cv-324-jdp, 2016 WL 4059222, at *3 (W.D. Wis. July 
29, 2016). 
 307.  N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 241 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 308.  See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican 
Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58, 63 
(2014) (“Judged through a partisan lens then, North Carolina’s law is just the latest Republican 
attempt to skew the electorate at least moderately to gain electoral advantage.”). 
 309.  See N.C. State Conference, 831 F.3d at 214 (observing that “on the day after the Supreme 
Court issued Shelby County v. Holder, . . . eliminating preclearance obligations, a leader of the 
party that newly dominated the legislature (and the party that rarely enjoyed African American 
support) announced an intention to enact what he characterized as an ‘omnibus’ election law”). 
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legislature studied the voting practices of African Americans and then 
adopted five different restrictions on voting and registration that 
uniquely impacted black Democrats, including a photo ID requirement, 
a ban on same day registration, and a truncated early voting period.310 
When a challenge to the law came before the Fourth Circuit in 2016, 
the federal appellate court concluded, “The only clear factor linking 
these various ‘reforms’ is their impact on African American voters. The 
record thus makes obvious that the ‘problem’ the majority in the 
General Assembly sought to remedy was emerging support for the 
minority party. Identifying and restricting the ways African Americans 
vote was an easy and effective way to do so.”311 The 4th Circuit struck 
down key provisions of the law, finding that the Republican legislature 
acted with discriminatory intent in violation of the Voting Rights Act. 
312 But Republican-controlled local election boards found alternative 
means to make voting harder for Democrats, such as cutting the 
number of early voting hours and locating early voting polling places 
in locations far removed from African Americans and college students, 
two core constituencies of the state’s Democratic Party.313 
Most remarkable of all, a senior Republican official in North 
Carolina frankly admitted the Republicans’ partisan motivations in 
adopting the new voting rules. After the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, Dallas 
Woodhouse, the executive director of the North Carolina Republican 
Party, emailed his fellow Republicans and urged them to “call your 
republican election board members and remind them that as partisan 
republican appointees they have [sic] duty to consider republican 
 
 310.  Id. at 216–17; see also id. at 214 (“[T]he legislature requested data on the use, by race, of 
a number of voting practices. Upon receipt of the race data, the General Assembly enacted 
legislation that restricted voting and registration in five different ways, all of which 
disproportionately affected African Americans.”). 
 311.  Id. at 238. 
 312.  Id. at 215. 
 313.  See, e.g., Michael Wines, Critics Say North Carolina Is Curbing Black Vote. Again., N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/us/politics/election-rules-north-
carolina.html (“In a county where Democrats outnumber Republicans by better than two to one, 
and four in 10 voters are black, the election plan limits voting to a single weekend day, and on 
weekdays demands that residents, including those who are poor and do not own cars, make long 
trips to cast a ballot.”); Jeremy W. Peters, Richard Fausset & Michael Wines, Black Turnout Soft 
in Early Voting, Boding Ill for Hillary Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/us/politics/black-turnout-falls-in-early-voting-boding-ill-
for-hillary-clinton.html (“In North Carolina, where a federal appeals court accused Republicans 
of an ‘almost surgical’ assault on black turnout and Republican-run election boards curtailed 
early-voting sites, black turnout is down 16 percent.”); Jim Morrill, Mecklenburg Elections Board 
Cuts Hours for Early Voting, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 15, 2016), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/election/article95843437.html.  
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points of view and that we support them as they ensure our elections 
are secure.”314 He later defended the state’s restrictive laws on 
unabashedly partisan grounds. “Does anybody think that Democrats 
did not select early voting sites and set hours to advantage their voters 
over Republicans?” he asked.315 “We are just attempting to rebalance 
the scales.”316 Most remarkable of all, the North Carolina Republican 
Party issued a press release celebrating the decline in African American 
turnout and the increase in “Caucasian voters” in the 2016 election.317 
Regardless of the precise number of voters affected by the 
manipulation of election administration rules, the larger point is it is 
unhealthy for any democracy to allow incumbent parties to target 
voters of the opposition party through voting restrictions. The contrast 
between America’s approach to voting rights and that of other nations, 
such as Australia, is striking. Healthy democracies take steps to 
encourage all eligible voters to participate in elections. In Australia, for 
example, voting is mandatory and turnout rates routinely approach 
100%.318 But in the United States, where voting rights are hotly 
contested and the administrative burdens imposed on voters are rising, 
participation rates are comparatively low. The turnout rate for the 
presidential election was only 59% in 2016, which is typical for recent 
elections.319 The unfortunate reality is in our current closely-divided 
political environment, where elections are often decided by a small 
margin and where a modest suppressing effect on turnout can be the 
difference between winning and losing, Americans partisans have a 
strong political incentive to discourage their opponents from showing 
up to vote. Consequently, while in countries like Australia election law 
is used to require all eligible voters to participate in elections, in the 
United States election law is used to make it harder for eligible voters 
to  exercise  their  right  to  vote.  The  stark  difference  in  approaches  
 
 314.  E-mail from Dallas Woodhouse, Exec. Dir. of the N.C. Republican Party to N.C. 
Republicans (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.wral.com/full-email-sent-by-dallas-woodhouse/ 
15938449/.  
 315.  Wines, supra note 313. 
 316.  Id. 
 317.  Emily Bazelon, The Supreme Court Ruled That Voting Restrictions Were a Bygone 
Problem. Early Voting Results Suggest Otherwise., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 7, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/magazine/the-supreme-court-ruled-that-voting-restrictions-
were-a-bygone-problem-early-voting-results-suggest-otherwise.html.  
 318.  Tim Evans, Compulsory Voting in Australia, AUSTL. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (Jan. 
16, 2006), http://www.aec.gov.au/About_Aec/Publications/voting/files/compulsory-voting.pdf.   
 319.  2016 November General Election Turnout Rates, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, 
http://www.electproject.org/2016g.  
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underscores the relative fragility of voting rights in the United States 
as compared to other western nations like Australia. 
Ultimately, however, the greatest threat to voting rights in the 
United States stems not from the battle over voter identification laws, 
but rather in the brewing battle over voter registration lists.320 There is 
no doubt that the voter registration rolls are inaccurate and outdated. 
A 2012 Pew Center on the States study found that the states’ voter 
registration lists include 24 million invalid or inaccurate registrations.321 
The reasons for the invalid and inaccurate registrations included voters 
who had had changed addresses, moved out of state, or died.322 The 
problem lies in the state-based, paper-dependent American 
registration system, which is far less accurate and efficient than the 
centralized online voter registration system used in countries like 
Canada.323 
Although the need to modernize the voter registration lists is clear, 
there is significant danger that partisan election officials could 
manipulate the registration process to disenfranchise voters on a scale 
far beyond strict photo identification laws. Even when done for benign 
purposes, the purging of voter registrations inherently involves huge 
numbers of voters. For example, in 2014 the states removed 14.8 million 
voters from voter registration lists on a variety of grounds, such as the 
voter’s death or the fact that the voter had moved out of the state or 
district.324 But control of voter registration lists could be weaponized by 
partisans to conduct an overly broad purge of the lists. For the moment 
at least, the National Voter Registration Act (the “NVRA”) requires 
states to provide fair notice before cancelling voter registrations.325 But 
the NVRA is merely a statute, which means to the extent it exceeds the 
Constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection, the 
 
 320.  See, e.g., Strawbridge Robinson, supra note 19; Mark Joseph Stern, Donald Trump’s 
Vote Fraud Investigation Will Finish What the GOP Started, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/01/donald_trump_s_vote_fr
aud_investigation_will_finish_what_the_gop_started.html (stating that Trump’s voter fraud 
investigation “will primarily serve as pretext for an assault on voting rights at both the state and 
federal level”).  
 321.  PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 269, at 1.  
 322.  Id. at 1–2. 
 323.  Mackenzie Weinger, Report: 1.8 million dead registered to vote, POLITICO (Feb. 14, 
2012), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/02/report-18m-dead-registered-to-vote-072830.  
 324.  U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, THE 2014 EAC ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 
AND VOTING SURVEY COMPREHENSIVE REPORT: A REPORT TO THE 114TH CONGRESS 3 (June 
30, 2015), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/2014_EAC_EAVS_Comprehensive_Report_508_ 
Compliant.pdf.  
 325.  52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(1)(B)(i). 
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NVRA could be amended to give states greater latitude to cancel voter 
registrations with less notice than is currently required. Such a change 
in the notice requirements could lead to a significant degree of voter 
disenfranchisement in states without same day registration. Only 14 
states and the District of Columbia currently offer same-day 
registration.326 In the 36 states without same-day registration, voters 
who are wrongfully purged from registration lists might not discover 
the mistake until election day, at which point it would be too late to 
correct the error. 
The Trump Administration’s pledge to conduct a “full evaluation of 
voting rolls” is thus chilling.327 President Trump has made clear that 
purging the voting rolls will be a focus of his administration.328 The 
importance of the issue to Trump was reflected in his announcement 
that Vice President Mike Pence will lead the administration’s “major 
investigation” of voter registration lists and state election 
administration policies.329 In an interview with FOX News, President 
Trump declared: “We can be babies, but you take a look at the 
registration, you have illegals, you have dead people, you have this, it’s 
really a bad situation, it’s really bad.”330  He further explained that the 
 
 326.  NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS, SAME DAY VOTER REGISTRATION (Jan. 11, 
2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx.  
 327.  See, e.g., Mike DeBonis & Sari Horwitz, In private meeting, Pence vows ‘full evaluation 
of voting rolls’ over claims of fraud, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/powerpost/in-private-meeting-pence-vows-full-evaluation-of-voting-rolls-over-claims-of-
voting-fraud/2017/01/27/1c1fa1de-e49a-11e6-a547-5fb9411d332c_story.html?utm_term=. 14f429 
54b55d&wpisrc=al_alert-COMBO-politics%252Bnation; Ben Jacobs & Sam Levin, Mike Pence: 
Trump administration planning ‘full evaluation’ of voter fraud, GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/26/trump-administration-voter-fraud-investigati 
on-mike-pence; Jenna Johnson & David Nakamura, Trump to sign executive order related to voter 
fraud, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/ 
01/26/trump-to-sign-executive-order-related-to-voter-fraud/?utm_term=.ae1f30 
e6a3b3&wpisrc=nl_politics-pm&wpmm=1.  
 328.  See Reena Flores, Trump taps Mike Pence to lead panel investigating mass voter fraud, 
CBS NEWS (Feb. 5, 2017), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-taps-mike-pence-to-lead-panel-
investigating-mass-voter-fraud/ (“When you look at the registration and you see dead people that 
have voted, when you see people that are registered in two states, that have voted in two states, 
when you see other things, when you see illegal people that are not citizens and they are on the 
registration roles – look, Bill, we can be babies, but you take a look at the registration, you have 
illegals, you have dead people you have this, it’s really a bad situation, it’s really bad.”). 
 329.  See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Trump’s call for election-fraud probe fraught with peril, 
POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-voter-fraud-234183; 
Rebecca Savransky, Trump to ask for ‘major investigation into voter fraud,’ HILL (Jan. 25, 2017), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/316006-trump-to-ask-for-major-investigation-into-
voter-fraud; Alan Yuhas, Pence to head commission investigating baseless voter fraud claim, 
Trump says, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/05/ 
donald-trump-mike-pence-commission-voter-fraud. 
 330.  Yuhas, supra note 329.  
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Pence Commission would scrutinize voting registration records across 
the country “very, very carefully.”331 Trump has already gone on the 
record to express his skepticism of the value of early voting,332 an 
apparent signal to Republican election officials to curtail the practice 
that minority voters disproportionately rely on. But a politically-
motivated purge of voting rolls would represent a dramatic and 
destabilizing escalation of the voting wars. Although the ultimate scope 
of the Pence Commission remains unclear, its potential for engaging in 
political mischief is enormous.333 The Republican majorities in the 
House and Senate give the Trump Administration a potential 
opportunity to amend the NVRA to water down the act’s notice 
provisions. And even within the framework of the NVRA’s current 
protections, partisans may be emboldened by the Pence Commission to 
only offer the most minimal notice of cancelled registrations. 
If democratic norms regarding the maintenance of voting 
registration lists break down, and partisans use their control over 
registration to systematically disenfranchise eligible voters, the 
ramifications for American democracy would be severe. Escalation and 
retaliation would be inevitable. Indeed, registration purges could be 
done by Democrats as easily as Republicans. Hyperpolarization has 
already led both parties to see the partisan battle in existential terms.334 
Democratic leaders have described Trump as an “illegitimate 
president”335 and recent polls find that many Democrats see Trump as 
a bigger threat to the nation than terrorism, unemployment, or 
racism.336 In such a bitter and confrontational political atmosphere, 
 
 331.  Id.  
 332.  Ben Kamisar, Trump questions merits of early voting, HILL (Dec. 9, 2016), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/309738-trump-questions-merits-of-early-voting.  
 333.  See Bob Bauer, The Pence Commission on Voting Fraud, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD 
LAW (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com /2017/02/pence-commission-voting-
fraud/ (“President Trump’s arrangement for an inquiry into election voting fraud is fatally 
compromised by political self-interest.”). 
 334.  See, e.g., Bob Bauer, Political Reform in an Era of “Existential Politics,” MORE SOFT 
MONEY HARD LAW (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2017/02/political-
reform-era-existential-politics; Richard Pildes, When Politics Becomes Existential, ELECTION 
LAW BLOG (Feb. 26, 2017), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=91331. 
 335.  Aaron Blake, John Lewis says Donald Trump isn’t a legitimate president, and Trump hits 
back hard, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/01/13/john-lewis-doesnt-think-donald-trump-is-a-legitimate-president/?utm_term 
=.136177b53249.  
 336.  PEW RES. CTR., ON EVE OF INAUGURATION, AMERICANS EXPECT NATION’S DEEP 
POLITICAL DIVISIONS TO PERSIST (2017), http://www.people-press.org/2017/01/19/on-eve-of-
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Democrats may be just as inclined as Republicans to attempt to 
disenfranchise the opposing party’s base voters. Moreover, the self-
sorting of the country geographically makes it just as easy to identify 
likely Republican voters as it is to identify likely Democratic voters, 
since the Republican base is now primarily made up of rural337 and 
blue-collar whites.338 The geographically concentrated nature of the two 
parties would permit Democratic-controlled legislatures to target likely 
Republican voters just as North Carolina Republicans targeted African 
American voters in 2016.339 The risk posed by partisan manipulation of 
voting rolls is thus quite high and deeply disconcerting. 
But the danger is not limited to voting rights. The voting wars 
present an even broader threat to America’s democratic institutions as 
a whole. 
C.  Undermined Democratic Institutions 
Partisan-inspired voting restrictions may make the difference in 
close elections, but do they really represent a long-term threat to 
America’s democratic institutions? There are troubling trend-lines that 
suggest the answer is yes. As Fareed Zakaria recently warned in the 
wake of President Trump’s voter fraud allegations, the United States is 
in danger of becoming an “illiberal democracy,”340 a nation that holds 
elections but systematically violates the political and civil rights of 
those who oppose the party in power.341 For at least the past decade, 
surveys have consistently found that Americans view their political 
system with a profound and rising degree of negativity.342 In a 2007 
book on the subject, Zakaria observed that “if current trends continue, 
democracy will undoubtedly face a crisis of legitimacy, which could 
prove crippling.”343 Hyperpolarization has made the situation 
significantly worse today. New research by the political scientists 
 
 337.  Lazaro Gamio, Urban and rural America are becoming increasingly polarized, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/urban-
rural-vote-swing.  
 338.  See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 295; Jim Tankersley, How Trump won: The revenge of 
working-class whites, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/ 
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 339.  See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 317; Michael Wines, supra note 313. 
 340.  Zakaria, supra note 8. 
 341.  Dani Rodrik & Sharun Mukand, Why Illiberal Democracies Are on the Rise, WORLD 
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 343.  Id. at 255. 
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Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk suggests that the risk of 
America evolving into an illiberal democracy is much higher than is 
generally understood. In a study published in the Journal of Democracy 
in January 2017, they found that Americans are increasingly 
disenchanted with liberal democratic norms.344 According to Foa and 
Mounk, Americans and citizens of other western democracies “are 
growing more disaffected with established political parties, 
representative institutions, and minority rights.”345 They are even 
“increasingly open to authoritarian interpretations of democracy.”346 
Donald Trump epitomizes the rejection of liberal democratic 
norms, such as respect for the rule of law and minority voting rights. To 
a degree without precedent in American history,347 he has challenged 
the integrity and legitimacy of the federal judiciary, the branch of 
government best positioned to adjudicate election law disputes in a 
neutral and objective fashion.348 For example, during the 2016 
campaign Trump claimed that the federal judge presiding over Trump’s 
civil fraud trial was biased against him because the judge, who was born 
in Indiana, was of Mexican-American heritage.349 Republican House 
Speaker Paul Ryan condemned Trump’s attack on the judge as “the 
textbook definition of a racist comment.”350 But Trump has not backed 
down from his challenge to the federal judiciary’s independence. After 
a federal court enjoined the Trump administration’s effort to ban 
refugees from seven Muslim countries, President Trump condemned 
the federal judge, describing him as a “so-called judge” and accusing 
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the judge of taking “law enforcement away from our country.”351 
Trump’s pattern of impeaching the integrity of the judges who rule 
against him encourages his supporters to question the legitimacy of all 
government institutions, which is a profoundly dangerous development 
for any democracy. 
Even more disturbing, Trump has stoked fear of minorities among 
his supporters by falsely claiming that illegal immigrants are voting in 
American elections by the millions. In the process, Trump has fostered 
an environment in which his supporters openly advocate 
disenfranchising whole categories of American voters. For example, 
Trump supporter and conservative columnist Ann Coulter has 
insinuated that voting rights should be limited to only those citizens 
who have four American-born grandparents.352 On the eve of the 2016 
election she tweeted, “If only people with at least four grandparents 
born in America were voting, Trump would win in a fifty state 
landslide.”353 Ironically, Trump’s mother was born in Scotland and his 
paternal grandfather was born in Germany, which would render him 
ineligible to exercise suffrage rights under Coulter’s proposal.354 But 
the larger point was that some of Trump’s most prominent and 
influential supporters openly question whether all Americans deserve 
the right to participate in American democracy. 
It is not just Trump’s most vitriolic supporters who propose 
disenfranchising whole classes of Americans. President Trump himself 
has called for an end to birthright citizenship, a measure that 
potentially could disenfranchise a huge number of Americans.355 Over 
twenty million American adults and sixteen million American children 
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have at least one foreign-born parent356 and the numbers are growing.357 
In addition, about 4.5 million American children have at least one 
undocumented immigrant parent.358 The idea of stripping citizenship 
rights from children born to unauthorized immigrants dates to the very 
beginning of Trump’s presidential campaign. In his campaign 
announcement address in 2015, he declared his opposition to the 
automatic award of citizenship to children born in the United States.359 
Many scholars believe that Trump’s position contradicts the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in 
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”360 It would thus 
likely take more than unilateral action by the president to end 
birthright citizenship. But notwithstanding the constitutional hurdles 
that Trump’s proposal may face, the simple fact that he would like to 
see an end to birthright citizenship is highly revealing. It reflects his 
broader agenda to reduce the number of Americans allowed to 
participate in democratic self-government. 
Trump’s voter fraud crusade also risks politicizing the Justice 
Department. The last time a president used the Justice Department to 
launch a voter fraud investigation the results undermined the 
credibility of the nation’s top law enforcement officials.361 In 2002 the 
Bush Administration’s nationwide investigation into allegations of 
voter fraud ultimately led to only 86 convictions for election-related 
crimes out of hundreds of millions of votes cast.362 Five years Attorney 
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General Alberto Gonzales was forced to resign when evidence came to 
light that the Bush Administration may have fired 3 U.S. Attorneys for 
refusing to bring politically-motivated voter fraud cases.363 A 2008 
report by the Inspector General concluded that the Justice 
“Department’s removal of the U.S. Attorneys and the controversy it 
created severely damaged the credibility of the Department and raised 
doubts about the integrity of Department prosecutive decisions.”364 
Now Trump wants to launch a new voter fraud investigation, only this 
time it will be headed by the vice president.365 If the Bush experience is 
any guide, Trump’s voter fraud investigation poses a serious threat to 
the independence and impartiality of the Justice Department. 
If Trump were a defeated candidate, his irresponsible statements 
about systemic voter fraud could be written off as sour grapes and their 
effects would be lessened with the passage of time. But Trump is 
launching his attacks from the White House. He holds the most 
powerful office in the American system of government, which means 
his false claims of voting fraud generate nationwide attention and build 
apprehension among his supporters that minority voters represent a 
threat to democracy. As the highly respected Washington Post 
journalist Dan Balz has recently warned, “Trump is now striking at the 
foundation of a democratic society.” Trump’s claim that millions voted 
illegally in 2016, Balz notes, “is either a deliberate attempt to 
undermine faith in the democratic process, an exhortation to those who 
favor new restrictions on access to the ballot box or the worrisome trait 
of someone with immense power willing to make wild statements 
without any credible evidence.”366 Similarly, Michael Waldman of the 
Brennan Center for Justice has observed of Trump’s voter fraud claims, 
“The president of the United States is peddling conspiracy theories that 
undermine our democracy for political gain.”367 Even Republican 
Senator Lindsay Graham of South Carolina has warned that Trump’s 
 
2002), https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/100802ballotintegrity.htm. 
 363.  GITLIN & WEISER, supra note 362 at 1, 3–5. 
 364.  OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFF. OF PROF’L RESP., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., AN 
INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 358 (2008), 
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0809a/final.pdf.  
 365.  Alan Yuhas, Pence to head commission investigating baseless voter fraud claim, Trump 
says, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/05/donald-
trump-mike-pence-commission-voter-fraud.  
 366.  Dan Balz, Trump’s voter fraud claims undermine the democratic process and his 
presidency, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-voter-
fraud-claims-undermine-the-voting-system-and-his-presidency/2017/01/24/a71d58ee-e288-11e6-
a453-19ec4b3d09ba_story.html?utm_term=.1e106029896c&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1.  
 367.  Waldman, supra note 361.  
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reckless claims of voter fraud undermined public “faith in our 
democracy.”368 
The situation is already quite disturbing but it could get far worse. 
In the event of a national crisis before the 2018 or 2020 elections—such 
as a war or a major terrorist attack—Trump has given every indication 
that his crisis-time leadership will be well outside America’s historical 
norms. During the Civil War and the world wars America continued to 
hold elections. But there is no guarantee that Trump would honor those 
traditions. He has thus far shown a stunning lack of regard for 
America’s democratic institutions. It is therefore all too conceivable 
that Trump might attempt to cancel or postpone a wartime election on 
national security grounds. It is also within the realm of possibility that 
Trump might attempt to direct Republican election administrators to 
remove from the voting rolls anyone suspected of “disloyalty” to the 
government. In short, anything seems possible under President Trump, 
a man who has lavished praised on Vladimir Putin, Russia’s 
authoritarian ruler.369 
Most worrisome of all, the concentration of power in the presidency 
gives Trump immense capacity to threaten America’s democratic 
institutions. In the 1970s Arthur Schlesinger Jr. warned that the 
constitutional limitations on the presidency had gradually given way to 
an “imperial presidency” with virtually unlimited power over foreign 
affairs.370 In recent years the powers of the presidency have expanded 
even further. In 2010 Bruce Ackerman warned that the powers 
concentrated in the presidency could “make it into a vehicle for 
demagogic populism and lawlessness in the century ahead.”371 Trump’s  
 
 
 368.  Jennifer Calfas, Graham to Trump: Stop alleging voter fraud, HILL (Jan. 24, 2017), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/315832-graham-to-trump-stop-lying-about-
voter-fraud.  
 369.  Trump’s long history of admiring, praising and defending Putin is too long to list here, 
but some representative samples include Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump lavishes praise on 
‘leader’ Putin, CNN (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/18/politics/donald-trump-
praises-defends-vladimir-putin; John Harwood, Donald Trump’s Admiration of Putin’s Ruthless 
Use of Power, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/us/politics/ 
donald-trump-vladimir-putin.html; Louis Nelson, Trump tweets praise of Putin: ‘I always knew he 
was very smart!,’ POLITICO (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/donald-trump-
praises-vladimir-putin-tweet-233072; Sophie Tatum, Trump defends Putin: ‘You think our 
country’s so innocent?,’ CNN (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/04/politics/donald-
trump-vladimir-putin.  
 370.  See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY viii (1973) (“The 
constitutional Presidency . . . has become the imperial Presidency.”).  
 371.  BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 4 (2010). 
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campaign rhetoric as well as his conduct in office make Ackerman’s 
warning disturbingly prophetic. 
The United States may be one of the world’s oldest democracies, 
but the institutions that undergird American democracy face an 
extraordinary challenge in the twenty-first century. The national mood 
is volatile and intensely polarized along partisan and racial lines. The 
president of the United States is falsely spreading fear that the election 
system is rigged. Public confidence has fallen sharply in the integrity of 
the election system and even in the liberal democratic values that the 
system is founded upon. There is simply no precedent in modern 
American history for the uniquely dangerous situation the nation 
currently finds itself in. The long-term ramifications for the nation’s 
democratic institutions are unknowable, but the risk that the nation will 
evolve into an illiberal democracy is all too clear. 
III.  STEPS TO DEFEND AND PRESERVE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
Democratic values form the bedrock foundation of modern 
American society. But amid the toxic political atmosphere of early 
twenty-first century America, the principles that sustain American 
democracy are in jeopardy. At a minimum, therefore, three steps are 
critically necessary to defend voting rights and preserve America’s 
democratic institutions at this dangerous moment in our history. 
A.  Nonpartisan Election Administration 
An election is only fair if it is administered in a neutral, unbiased 
way. Accordingly, in an ideal world, all aspects of federal and state 
election administration would be placed in the hands of nonpartisan 
officials who are accountable to courts, not legislatures. As Daniel 
Tokaji has argued, “[t]he most important institutional reform is the 
development of state election management bodies that are insulated 
from partisan politics.”372 Amid intense hyperpolarization, the long-
standing practice of partisan election administration is neither wise nor 
sensible. It is simply unrealistic to expect partisan elected officials to 
serve as unbiased referees in the hotly contested atmosphere of 
contemporary American politics. Richard Hasen put it well when he 
observed that “the people running our elections should not have a 
vested interest in their outcome.”373 The public agrees. Surveys have 
 
 372.  Tokaji, supra note 159, at 144. 
 373.  Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election 
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found that at least 66% of Americans want non-partisan officials to 
administer elections.374 Ironically, therefore, in this era of 
hyperpolarization, the principle of non-partisan election 
administration is one of the few public policy issues that elicits a broad 
consensus of bipartisan support. 
There are no shortages of models that the federal and state 
governments could look to for guidance. Australia and Canada both 
offer examples of major western democracies that rely on nonpartisan 
administration of national and local elections.375 Their experience 
makes clear that nonpartisan election administration is both achievable 
and desirable. The common theme is they both rely on independent 
electoral commissions,376 which takes politicians completely out of the 
business of running elections. 
As America’s neighbor and close ally, Canada provides the most 
instructive foreign example. Under Canadian law, all federal and 
provincial redistricting (which Canadians call “redistribution”) is done 
by independent commissions.377 At the federal level, responsibility for 
the administration of Parliamentary elections is assigned to the Chief 
Electoral Officer, an independent, non-partisan government office 
appointed by unanimous consent of the House of Commons.378 
Canada’s commitment to nonpartisan election administration is so 
deep that Canadian law prohibits the Chief Electoral Officer from 
voting in federal elections.379 The Chief Electoral Officer overseas 
Elections Canada, which administers federal elections, and the CEO 
makes a post-election report to Parliament of recommendations for the 
improvement of election administration nationwide.380 Canada also has 
a federally-maintained national voter list, the National Register of 
Electors, which is computerized and fully integrated with other 
government  agencies  to  ensure  its  accuracy.381  In  addition,  each  of  
 
 
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 974 (2005). 
 374.  Tokaji, supra note 159, at 132. 
 375.  ELECTIONS CANADA, COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF CENTRAL ELECTORAL 
AGENCIES (2014), http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rec/tech/comp&doc 
ument=p4&lang=e.  
 376.  Tokaji, supra note 159, at 138. 
 377.  Gaughan, supra note 257, at 1049–56. 
 378.  Jean-Pierre Kingsley, The Administration of Canada’s Independent, Non-Partisan 
Approach, 3 ELECTION L.J. 406, 406 (2004). 
 379.  Id. 
 380.  Id. at 408. 
 381.  Id. at 408–09. 
GAUGHAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2017  11:44 AM 
2017] ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 121 
Canada’s 10 provinces have a chief provincial electoral officer of their 
own.382 
Canada’s reliance on nonpartisan election administration 
correlates with far higher voter registration levels than those found in 
the United States. Whereas only 76% of eligible American citizens are 
registered to vote, 93% of eligible Canadian citizens are registered to 
vote.383 Furthermore, Canada’s independent restricting commissions 
ensure that Parliamentary districts—known as ridings—have lines 
drawn in a non-partisan fashion to promote political competition. As 
the Canadian political scientist John Courtney has explained, the 
adoption of independent election commissions is “one of the 
democratic advances of the last half-century in Canadian political 
institutions” and they are “widely seen as fair, nonpartisan, and 
independent bodies.”384 
There are a few models closer to home as well, although on a much 
more modest and limited scale. Iowa’s nonpartisan redistricting process 
is a case in point. Iowa state law provides that “[n]o district shall be 
drawn for the purpose of favoring a political party, incumbent legislator 
or member of Congress, or other person or group, or for the purpose of 
augmenting or diluting the voting strength of a language or racial 
minority group.”385 To that end, Iowa has established the Legislative 
Services Agency, a non-partisan agency tasked with drawing Iowa’s 
legislative and congressional district lines in a neutral, non-partisan 
manner.386 A handful of other states have adopted independent 
commissions for redistricting, including Arizona and California.387 
Importantly, however, Arizona, California, and Iowa only use 
nonpartisan approaches for redistricting. Other features of election 
administration in those states remain under partisan control. 
Nonpartisan redistricting such as is practiced in Iowa is a good start, 
but the principles of nonpartisanship must be extended to all aspects of 
election administration. Scholars have offered a number of promising 
 
 382.  See, e.g., GREG ESSENSA, ELECTIONS ONTARIO STRATEGIC PLAN, 2013-2017 2–3 
(2014), http://www.elections.on.ca/content/dam/NGW/sitecontent/2014/reports/Strategic%20P 
lan%20(2013-2017).pdf.  
 383.  PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 269, at 2, 3, 8. 
 384.  JOHN C. COURTNEY, ELECTIONS 71 (2004). 
 385.  IOWA CODE § 42.4(5). 
 386.  ED COOK, LEGIS. SERVS. AGENCY, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING IN IOWA 
2, 20 (2007), https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/Central/Guides/redist.pdf.  
 387.  ROYCE CROCKER, CONG. RES. SERV., R42831, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: AN 
OVERVIEW 17–18 (2012). 
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options to do precisely that. For example, Edward Foley has proposed 
creating a system of separate electoral powers modeled on the 
Constitution’s separation of substantive government powers.388 In 
separating electoral from substantive government powers, Foley 
recommends creating three specialized electoral institutions: an 
electoral assembly, an electoral executive, and an electoral judiciary.389 
In a similar vein, Christopher Elmendorf has argued for the use of a 
permanent advisory committee empowered to draft legislation and 
submit bills for approval by the legislature or by the people through a 
popular referendum.390 Richard Hasen has advocated for the creation 
of chief electoral officers in the states on the model of the Canadian 
and Australian systems.391 As a further safeguard against partisanship, 
Hasen has recommended that the chief electoral officers be appointed 
by the respective state governors and confirmed by a supermajority of 
the respective state legislatures, thus insuring that both parties have a 
role in the selection of a truly nonpartisan chief electoral officer.392 And 
Heather Gerken has proposed the systematic ranking of the quality of 
state election administration in order to create public pressure on states 
that perform poorly.393 
As a matter of law and policy, all of those proposals have great 
merit. Although the Constitution assigns responsibility for election law 
administration to legislative bodies, there is no constitutional barrier 
that prevents Congress and the state legislatures from investing non-
partisan agencies with the authority to administer elections. In fact, the 
Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to 
regulate the terms of federal elections, including requiring that the 
states adopt nonpartisan administration of federal elections.394 The 
Elections Clause states that: 
 
 388.  Edward B. Foley, The Separation of Electoral Powers, 74 MONT. L. REV. 139, 140 (2013). 
 389.  Id. at 147. 
 390.  See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory 
Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366, 1371 (2005) (“I argue that a 
permanent advisory commission, authorized to place its concerns on the legislature’s agenda or a 
referendum ballot, and positioned to compete with legislators for the voters’ trust, could 
substantially impede political insiders’ efforts to hamstring would-be challengers.”). 
 391.  Hasen, supra note 373, at 983. 
 392.  Id. at 984. 
 393.  See HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS 
FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 5 (2009) (“[W]e should create a Democracy Index that ranks states 
and localities based on election performance. . . . The Index would tell voters not only whether 
things are working in their own state, but how their state compares to its neighbors.”). 
 394.  See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253–54 (2013); see 
also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2670 (2015). 
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The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the Legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.395 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the clause as giving Congress 
sweeping authority over the conduct of federal elections. As the Court 
recently reiterated, “The power of Congress over the ‘Times, Places and 
Manner’ of congressional elections ‘is paramount, and may be 
exercised at any time, and to any extent which it deems expedient.’”396 
If Congress wanted to take action to promote nonpartisan election 
administration, it has the unquestioned constitutional authority to do 
so, at least with regard to federal elections.    
Nevertheless, despite public support for the idea, the adoption of 
nonpartisan election administration is simply not on the horizon. Since 
the late eighteenth century, incumbent politicians have zealously 
exercised their power over election administration to gain political 
advantage over the party out of power. Support for reform is thus 
chronically confined to whichever party is the minority party at a given 
moment. It is a classic Catch 22 situation: the only party that has an 
incentive to see nonpartisan election administration adopted is the 
party out of power, but the very fact that it is the minority party makes 
it powerless to effect change. Moreover, the minority party 
immediately loses interest in reforming the system the moment it 
becomes the majority party. 
The decentralized nature of the American election system poses 
additional obstacles to reform. Although the Elections Clause gives 
Congress plenary authority over federal elections, Congress has chosen 
to delegate election administration to the states. Consequently, the 
United States has a deeply decentralized election system in which the 
states and local governments have a commanding role in the 
administration of both federal and state elections.397 America’s long-
standing commitment to federalism, which dates back to the 
 
 395.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 4. 
 396.  Inter Tribal Council, 133 S. Ct. at 2253–54. 
 397.  See Nathaniel Persily, “Celebrating” the Tenth Anniversary of the 2000 Election 
Controversy: What the World Can Learn from the Recent History of Election Dysfunction in the 
United States, 44 IND. L. REV. 85, 85 (2010) (“The first glaring institutional feature evident to even 
the most casual observer of the U.S. electoral system is the extreme decentralization of 
administrative responsibilities and policymaking.”); Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law 
Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747, 752–53 (2016). 
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Constitution itself, is not something that will be easily dislodged.398 A 
shift to non-partisan administration will likely require that individual 
states take action on their own to embrace principles of neutrality in 
election administration. Thus, as Edward Foley has argued, the first step 
in achieving structural reform of the American political system is to 
take a long-term view.399 He advocates the creation of a bipartisan 
commission to propose constitutional reforms that take effect decades 
after the current generation of politicians have retired.400 As Foley 
explains, “It might seem frustrating to have to wait fifty years to 
implement a reform that people today, if they set aside self-interest, 
would recognize as benefiting the public. But the basic point is that 
without the mechanism of long-term implementation delay, the reform 
will not be adopted at all. Waiting fifty years, then, is better than never.” 
401 Indeed, the unfortunate reality is that it will take years and quite 
possibly decades to accomplish the goal of nonpartisan election 
administration on a nationwide basis. 
Accordingly, in the short and medium term, the integrity and 
fairness of American election administration depends on the courts. 
Now more than ever, the state and federal court systems operate as the 
last line of defense for democratic principles and voting rights in this 
poisonous political era. 
B.  Carolene Products Inspired Courts 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the danger posed to 
democracy by self-interested legislators controlling the election 
administration process. In the famous footnote four of Carolene 
Products, the Supreme Court suggested that “more exacting judicial 
scrutiny” may be appropriate when legislatures insulate incumbents 
from the political process and where “discrete and insular minorities” 
are discriminated against.402 The state and federal courts hearing voting 
rights cases today must take particular heed of such warnings amid the  
 
 398.  See Kropf & Kimball, supra note 174, at 109–10 (“Federal legislation to say all the states 
must have a non-partisan chief election officer who appoints all the officials is counter to the 
political culture of federalism in our country.”). 
 399.  Edward B. Foley, The Posterity Project: Developing a Method for Long-Term Political 
Reform, OKLA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) (“The only possible solution is to shift gears and adopt a long-
term perspective.”). 
 400.  See id. (proposing the creation of a “new Posterity Project designed to develop a series 
of specific amendments to the United States Constitution”). 
 401.  Id.  
 402.  United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
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dangerous excesses of extreme partisanship and widespread false 
allegations of election fraud. 
The independent nature of the judiciary makes its role in policing 
election administration disputes absolutely indispensable. Although 
both the state and federal judiciaries serve as a bulwark for protecting 
constitutional freedoms, the federal courts in particular have a special 
responsibility to defend the integrity of the democratic system from 
partisan attacks.403 Endowed with lifetime appointments, federal judges 
possess unique freedom from political pressure. Although the Senate 
may block judicial appointments, as underscored by the battle over the 
Merrick Garland nomination,404 once confirmed a federal judge is not 
beholden to the good graces of any political party or elected official. 
Thus, while both state and federal courts are crucial to defending voting 
rights, federal judges have the strongest and most independent basis for 
doing so. 
Until recently, however, both the state and federal courts have 
usually taken a highly deferential approach to state legislatures in 
election administration cases.405 The federal constitution expressly 
assigns to the legislative branch control over election administration, 
which naturally gives a presumption of legitimacy to new election laws 
that are not facially discriminatory. Moreover, as Nathaniel Persily has 
pointed out, “most of the classic barriers to participation have been 
replaced with complicated and subtle strategies dedicated to 
maintaining incumbent parties and officeholders in their current 
positions of power.”406 As a result, the courts have often taken a passive 
approach even in the context of highly controversial voter ID cases.407 
 
 403.  See Tokaji, supra note 159, at 129 (“Federal courts, as the institution most independent 
of partisan politics, should play an essential role in policing the administration of elections for the 
foreseeable future.”). 
 404.  Paul Kane, As the Gorsuch nomination proceeds, this man is taking credit: Mitch 
McConnell, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/as-the-
gorsuch-nomination-proceeds-this-man-is-taking-credit-mitch-mcconnell/2017/02/18/a9d66a46-
f5eb-11e6-b9c9-e83fce42fb61_story.html?utm_term=.302a2d2e98f7.  
 405.  See Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)Trusting States to Run Election, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553, 
602 (2015) (“Current Supreme Court doctrine defers too readily to states to administer 
elections.”). 
 406.  NATHANIEL PERSILY, THE PLACE OF COMPETITION IN AMERICAN ELECTION LAW, IN 
THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 
171 (Michael P. McDonald and John Samples, eds., 2006).  
 407.  See Joshua A. Douglas, Is The Right To Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 143, 145 (2008) (“[O]ur legal system has not always given an individual’s right to vote 
the same venerated status as it has given many other important rights.”). 
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For example, in Crawford v. Marion County408 the Supreme Court 
upheld Indiana’s photo ID law because it appeared to be a “neutral, 
nondiscriminatory regulation of voting procedure” and the court 
feared that striking the law down would frustrate “the intent of the 
elected representatives of the people.”409 In Crawford the Supreme 
Court emphasized that “if a nondiscriminatory law is supported by 
valid neutral justifications, those justifications should not be 
disregarded simply because partisan interests may have provided one 
motivation for the votes of individual legislators.”410 
But there is now strong reason to conclude the Court was wrong 
when it assumed that the wave of election “integrity” measures 
adopted by partisan legislatures are justified by legitimate public policy 
concerns and are non-discriminatory and neutral in application. As 
discussed above, in the 9 years since Crawford was decided, academic 
studies, government investigations, and court cases have developed 
overwhelming evidence that indicates that in-person voter fraud is not 
a serious threat to election integrity.411 Moreover, both academic 
studies and a growing number of lower federal courts have concluded 
that the real purpose of voter identification laws and other election 
“reforms” is to depress minority turnout.412 In light of the increasing 
evidence of the malignant motives of at least some election integrity 
measures, combined with the complete lack of evidence of widespread 
voter fraud, the courts as a whole are unwise to continue to defer to the 
states when it comes to laws that impose new voting restrictions. 
Courts must also break with precedent by taking a more proactive 
role during election campaigns. Historically there has been a long-
standing judicial reluctance to intervene in election law disputes late in 
political campaigns.413 In Purcell v. Gonzalez,414 the Supreme Court 
expressed the concern that “[c]ourt orders affecting elections, 
especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion 
and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls” particularly 
during the period shortly before an election.415 The Supreme Court has 
 
 408.  553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 409.  Id. at 203. 
 410.  Id. at 204. 
 411.  See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 412.  Id.  
 413.  See Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 428 
(2015) (defining the Purcell principle as “the idea that courts should not issue orders which change 
election rules in the period just before the election”). 
 414.  549 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 415.  Id. at 4–5. 
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thus discouraged judges from issuing rulings that change or suspend 
voting laws late in election campaign seasons. Without question, the 
Purcell principle makes sense in a stable, non-polarized electoral 
context in which partisan actors abide by traditional norms of 
democratic conduct. But we no longer live in such an age. The 
escalating voting wars have emboldened partisans to ram through 
legislatures on party-line votes new laws that run a high risk of voter 
disenfranchisement. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the 
VRA’s preclearance formula means that many disputes over section 2 
of the VRA will be adjudicated after elections are held, when the 
damage is already done.416 Accordingly, it is a mistake for courts to 
blindly apply the Purcell principle when a rapidly expanding number 
of new election laws threaten voting rights.417 
To be sure, the basic logic of the Purcell principle has obvious merit 
in certain categories of cases, such as where the legal dispute involves 
ballot design or ballot access. In such cases there must be a reasonable 
cut-off point barring further judicial intervention in order to allow 
election authorities to print ballots in a timely fashion. This is 
particularly important at a time when early and absentee voters now 
make up 35% of all ballots cast.418 Accordingly, applying the Purcell 
principle in such cases to the period that stretches from the printing of 
early and absentee ballots through Election Day is a reasonable middle 
ground. It allows courts time to resolve complex voting rights cases 
while still giving election authorities sufficient time to print ballots and 
prepare polling places. But when the ballot itself is not at issue, courts 
should remain prepared to intervene until virtually the moment early 
and absentee voting begins. 
There are hopeful signs that the judiciary recognizes the deepening 
threat to democratic government and the need to intervene even 
relatively late in campaigns. During the 2016 election campaign season, 
the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, and the Tenth Circuit all blocked 
voting laws adopted by Republican legislatures. For example, in Fish v. 
 
 416.  On Section 2 of the VRA, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 304. As he explained, “[t]he 
burden of proof is on the plaintiff under Section 2 but on the jurisdiction under Section 5. The 
default is that a challenged policy goes into effect under Section 2 but that it does not under 
Section 5.” Id. at 57. 
 417.  See Hasen, supra note 413, at 428–29. 
 418.  DREW DESILVER & ABIGAIL GEIGER, PEW RES. CTR., FOR MANY AMERICANS, 
ELECTION DAY IS ALREADY HERE (2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/21/for-
many-americans-election-day-is-already-here/.  
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Kobach,419 the Tenth Circuit enjoined a Kansas law requiring voter 
registration applicants to produce documentary proof of American 
citizenship.420 In holding that the National Voter Registration Act 
preempted the Kansas law, the court observed that the NVRA 
reflected “Congress’s determination that the public interest in the 
widespread exercise of the franchise trumps the narrower interest of 
ensuring that not a single noncitizen votes (or an insubstantial number 
of them).”421 The Tenth Circuit also pointedly noted that “exceedingly 
few noncitizens have been shown to have voted compared to the 
number of Kansans who stand to lose the right to vote in the coming 
elections.”422 
The Fifth Circuit also acted to enjoin a discriminatory voting law 
before the 2016 election. In Veasey v. Abbott,423 the federal appellate 
court ruled that Texas’s voter ID law violated Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act.424 The Fifth Circuit was particularly impressed by the trial 
court’s finding that the voter ID law imposed special burdens on the 
poor, who were less likely to have the type of photo ID required by the 
law, and by the trial court’s additional finding that minorities 
constituted a disproportionately large share of Texans living in 
poverty.425 The Fifth Circuit thus affirmed the trial court’s finding that 
the Texas statute “acted in concert with current and historical 
conditions of discrimination to diminish African Americans’ and 
Hispanics’ ability to participate in the political process.”426 Also in 2016, 
as discussed above, the Fourth Circuit struck down portions of North 
Carolina’s sweeping new election law on grounds that it was motivated 
by discriminatory racial intent in violation of the Voting Rights Act.427 
Moreover, just six weeks before the presidential election, the Sixth 
Circuit reversed the state of Ohio’s purge of its voter registration lists. 
 
 419.  840 F.3d 710 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 420.  Id. at 717. 
 421.  Id. at 756. 
 422.  Id.  
 423.  830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 424.  Id. at 265. 
 425.  Id. at 264. 
 426.  Id. 
 427.  See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 238 (4th Cir. 2016) (“The 
record thus makes obvious that the ‘problem’ the majority in the General Assembly sought to 
remedy was emerging support for the minority party. Identifying and restricting the ways African 
Americans vote was an easy and effective way to do so. We therefore must conclude that race 
constituted a but-for cause of SL 2013–381, in violation of the Constitutional and statutory 
prohibitions on intentional discrimination.”). 
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In A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Husted,428 a group of plaintiff’s 
challenged the Ohio Secretary of State’s purge of hundreds of 
thousands of voters from the state’s voting rolls on the sole grounds 
that the voters had not voted in the previous six years.429 The state 
defended the purge on the grounds that it had mailed notices of the 
pending purge to affected voters.430 The Sixth Circuit held that the 
purge violated the NVRA because a voter’s failure to vote in recent 
elections was not a sufficient basis on its own terms to assume that the 
voter had changed residences.431 
There are even signs that the Supreme Court itself may be ready to 
embrace a standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering cases. In 
November 2016, a 3-judge federal panel in Wisconsin struck down the 
state legislature’s redistricting map on grounds that it was an 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.432 The court based its reasoning 
on an “efficiency gap” measurement433 developed by Nicholas 
Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee.434 The “efficiency gap” measures 
how many wasted votes—i.e. votes for losing candidates or votes for 
winning candidates in excess of the bare minimum needed to win—that 
a redistricting map results in for each party.435 Under this approach, if 
 
 428.  838 F.3d 699 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 429.  See id. at 703 (“[U]nder the Supplemental Process, a voter is purged from the rolls after 
six years of inactivity—even if he or she did not move and otherwise remains eligible to vote.”); 
see also Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Hundreds of Thousands of Ohio Voters Restored to 
Rolls, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.bna.com/hundreds-thousands-ohio-
n57982077690. 
 430.  See A. Philip Randolph Inst., 838 F.3d at 703 (“[V]oters sent a confirmation notice are 
removed from the rolls if they subsequently fail to vote for four years and fail to either respond 
to the notice or re-register.”); id. at 711 (“[T]he Secretary reiterates that the Supplemental Process 
incorporates subsection (d)’s requirement that the voter must fail to respond to a confirmation 
notice before that voter can be removed from the rolls.”). 
 431.  Id. at 712. 
 432.  Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2016 WL 6837229, at *71 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2016). 
 433.  See id. at *9 (“They therefore urge the court to adopt a new measure for assessing the 
discriminatory effect of political gerrymanders—the efficiency gap (or ‘EG’). ‘The efficiency gap 
is the difference between the parties’ respective wasted votes in an election, divided by the total 
number of votes cast.’”). 
 434.  See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the 
Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2015) (“We dub our new measure the ‘efficiency 
gap.’ It represents the difference between the parties’ respective wasted votes in an election—
where a vote is wasted if it is cast (1) for a losing candidate, or (2) for a winning candidate but in 
excess of what she needed to prevail.”). 
 435.  See id. at 834 (The efficiency gap “represents the difference between the parties’ 
respective wasted votes in an election—where a vote is wasted if it is cast (1) for a losing candidate, 
or (2) for a winning candidate but in excess of what she needed to prevail. Large numbers of votes 
commonly are cast for losing candidates as a result of the time-honored gerrymandering 
technique of ‘cracking.’ Likewise, excessive votes often are cast for winning candidates thanks to 
the equally age-old mechanism of ‘packing.’ The efficiency gap essentially aggregates all of a 
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the minority party consistently has significantly more wasted votes than 
the majority party, it serves as strong evidence of an unconstitutional 
gerrymander, absent a legitimate justification for the difference. 
Relying on the efficiency gap measurement, the Wisconsin court held 
that the legislature’s redistricting plan was indeed an unconstitutional 
gerrymander because it systematically diluted the voting strength of 
Democratic voters without a constitutionally valid reason for doing 
so.436 Wisconsin has appealed the court’s ruling to the Supreme Court, 
which means that potentially partisan gerrymandering’s days could be 
numbered.437 
The recent intervention of federal courts across the country to 
block laws that undermine the right to vote is encouraging. The rulings 
indicate that the courts increasingly recognize that partisan changes to 
voting rights must be scrutinized with great skepticism by the judiciary. 
The 2016 rulings are also heartening for another reason. The judges 
who wrote the opinions were appointed by both Republican and 
Democratic presidents. Judge Diana Gribbon Motz, the Fourth Circuit 
judge who wrote the opinion in McCrory, was appointed by Bill 
Clinton,438 whereas Jerome Holmes,439 the Tenth Circuit judge who 
wrote the opinion in Fish v. Kobach, and Catharina Haynes, the Fifth 
Circuit judge who wrote the opinion in Veasey v. Abbott,440 were both 
appointed by George W. Bush. To be sure, the judges in those circuits 
did not unanimously agree on the issues before them and some 
conservative judges filed strong dissents.441 But the political and 
ideological diversity of the judges in each circuit majority is grounds for 
at least cautious optimism. It demonstrates that the effort to preserve 
voting rights and defend our democratic institutions is not an issue that 
 
district plan’s cracking and packing choices into a single, tidy number.”). 
 436.  See Whitford, 2016 WL 6837229, at *1 (“We find that Act 43 was intended to burden the 
representational rights of Democratic voters throughout the decennial period by impeding their 
ability to translate their votes into legislative seats. Moreover, as demonstrated by the results of 
the 2012 and 2014 elections, among other evidence, we conclude that Act 43 has had its intended 
effect. Finally, we find that the discriminatory effect is not explained by the political geography 
of Wisconsin nor is it justified by a legitimate state interest. Consequently, Act 43 constitutes an 
unconstitutional political gerrymander.”).  
 437.  BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. WHITFORD V. GILL (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.brennan 
center.org/legal-work/whitford-v-gill.  
 438.  See Judge Diana Gribbon Motz, 4th Cir. http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/judges/judges-of-
the-court/judge-diana-gribbon-motz.  
 439.  See Judge Jerome A. Holmes, 10th Cir. https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/judges/judge-
jerome-holmes.  
 440.  See Judge Catharina Haynes, Fed. Judicial Ctr. http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo 
?jid=3169&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na.  
 441.  See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 322 (5th Cir. 2016) (Clement, J., dissenting).  
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must inevitably divide liberals and conservatives. Voting rights and fair 
elections are cornerstone principles of democracy that should attract 
support from all ends of the ideological spectrum. 
C.  The Bipartisan Supermajority Principle 
As the Supreme Court’s struggle to identify a standard for 
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering cases demonstrates, the courts 
do not have the authority to invalidate new election laws merely on 
policy grounds. They must have a constitutional or statutory basis to do 
so and they must have judicially manageable standards for adjudicating 
the dispute. 
Consequently, one of the major stumbling blocks the courts have 
faced over the years in defending voting rights is the complicated 
constitutional basis of the right to vote. A unique feature of American 
democracy is that the fundamental right to vote is primarily vested in 
state law, not federal law.442 The Constitution bars racial and gender 
discrimination in voting and requires that due process and equal 
protection under law be afforded to all qualified voters.443 But the 
states, not the federal government, determine voter qualifications.444 As 
the Supreme Court recently emphasized, “the Elections Clause 
empowers Congress to regulate how federal elections are held, but not 
who may vote in them”445 
The modest textual basis of federal voting rights has left the full 
parameters of the constitutional protections afforded to voters unclear 
and highly contested. Accordingly, scholars have played a key role in 
proposing various constitutional rationales for courts to invoke. Some 
have developed individual theories of the right to vote.446 Richard 
Hasen, for example, contends that the courts should focus on defending 
“certain core rights” of equality under the law for all voters.447 Atiba 
 
 442.  See Douglas, supra note 26, at 93 (“In fact, unlike virtually every state constitution, the 
U.S. Constitution does not actually confer the right to vote on anyone. Instead, the right to vote 
stems from the general language of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and 
the negative mandates on who the government may not disenfranchise.”). 
 443.  See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XIX, XXVI. 
 444.  See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2258 (2013) 
(“[T]he Elections Clause empowers Congress to regulate how federal elections are held, but not 
who may vote in them.”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964). 
 445.  Inter Tribal Council., 133 S. Ct. at 2258. 
 446.  See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDING 
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 139, 154 (2003); Ellis, supra note 16, at 1036 
(warning of the “use of economic restraints to effectively increase the cost of voting to the voter”). 
 447.  Hasen, supra note 446, at 154. 
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Ellis has warned that the costs associated with voting can effectively 
disenfranchise voters based on their socioeconomic status.448 He argues 
that courts should prevent such disenfranchisement by “formulating a 
uniform right to vote which is not bound by socioeconomic biases or 
the whims of a potentially tyrannical majority.”449 Others have 
articulated a structural theory of voting rights that emphasizes 
preserving democratic institutions and political competition.450 For 
example, Richard Pildes has contended that “familiar models of 
individual rights and equality are inadequate to address constitutional 
harms presented by the problem of political self-entrenchment.”451 He 
recommends that courts focus on the constitutional obligation “to 
design recount processes, and perhaps voting or democratic processes 
more generally, that sufficiently cabin the risk of partisan, self-
interested manipulation.”452 Building on both the individual rights and 
structuralist approaches, Guy-Uriel Charles contends that courts may 
“use an individual rights framework to confront the structural 
pathologies of the electoral process.”453 Franita Tolson has called for a 
focus on the constitutional text, pointing to the Voter Qualifications 
Clause of the federal constitution as a powerful safeguard for voting 
rights in federal elections.454 She argues that the clause offers courts a 
basis to “apply heightened scrutiny to all regulations governing the 
right to vote” and thereby “strike down restrictive regulations that are 
not supported by empirical evidence, or that do not directly respond to 
a problem in the state’s electoral system.”455 
The state constitutions also provide a potentially powerful ally for 
judges to turn to in defending voting rights. Although the federal 
constitution does not confer an express right to vote, 49 of the 50 state 
 
 448.  Ellis, supra note 16, at 1067. 
 449.  Id. 
 450.  See Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 
1201, 1219 (1996) (“The relevant equal protection concern in this context, therefore, is not the 
protection of an empty individual right to be free from racial classification, but rather the 
collective right, recognized in Hunter v. Erickson, of groups of voters who affiliate along racial 
lines to participate in the political process on an equal footing with voters who choose to affiliate 
based on other shared characteristics.”).  
 451.  Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
28, 41 (2004). 
 452.  Id. at 49. 
 453.  Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2005). 
 454.  Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter Qualifications 
Clause of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159, 161–62 (2015). 
 455.  Id. at 162.  
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constitutions expressly do so.456 Crucially, the state constitutions define 
voting rights as mandatory, which means that in almost every state the 
fundamental right of the state’s citizens to vote takes precedence over 
the legislature’s control of election regulation.457 Joshua Douglas has 
made a compelling case that the state constitutions therefore provide a 
strong legal foundation for courts to defend voting rights in an era of 
partisan manipulation of election laws. Citing the state constitutions’ 
express guarantee of the fundamental right to vote, Douglas has 
proposed reversing the long-standing Burdick test, whereby the 
ultimate burden rests with plaintiffs to prove that an election law 
infringes on voting rights.458 The Burdick test is a hard one for plaintiffs 
to meet because, as Douglas explains, “[a] court following Burdick will 
reverse the presumption of validity and hold the state to a higher 
threshold only if the court finds that the law imposes a severe 
burden.”459 Since most voter identification laws affect a relatively small 
percentage of the population, it is difficult for plaintiffs to show that the 
laws are severely burdensome. Douglas, however, proposes using the 
state constitutional guarantees as justification for flipping the 
framework to put the heavier burden on the government to justify the 
laws.460 He argues that laws adding voter qualifications should be 
presumptively invalid as a matter of state constitutional law unless the 
state overcomes “that presumption with direct evidence showing that 
the law is consistent with the state constitution’s specific conferral of 
legislative power to regulate elections.”461 Douglas’s proposal is one 
that federal and state courts would be wise to adopt. 
Whatever constitutional theories the courts choose to adopt, the 
bottom line is partisan advocates of new restrictions on voting rights do 
 
 456.  See Douglas, supra note 26, at 91 (“Virtually every state constitution confers the right to 
vote to its citizens in explicit terms.”). 
 457.  See id. at 136 (“State constitutions thus grant the right to vote in mandatory terms and 
only secondarily delegate legislative control to regulate some aspects of the election process.”). 
 458.  Id. at 138. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)) (“A court considering a challenge to a state election law 
must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests 
put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into 
consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s 
rights.’”). 
 459.  See Douglas, supra note 26, at 138. 
 460.  See id. at 138–39 (“Flipping the normal federal framework and imposing a presumption 
of invalidity to laws that add voter qualifications is justified because state constitutions already 
support this analytical move.”). 
 461.  Id. at 139. 
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not deserve the benefit of the doubt. Judges must be much more 
skeptical of partisan election authorities’ claims that “election 
integrity” necessitates strict voting regulations.462 The courts should 
scrutinize such claims closely and should not defer to state legislatures 
when obvious partisan motivations lie behind the adoption of such 
laws.463 As John Hart Ely observed, courts should intervene to address 
“malfunctioning” political processes where the incumbents are 
“choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will 
stay in and the outs will stay out” or are “systematically disadvantaging 
some minority . . . and thereby denying the minority the protection 
afforded to other groups by a representative system.”464 The federal 
courts have adopted such an approach in the context of campaign 
finance law. For example, the Supreme Court has struck down 
excessively low contribution limits which threatened to undermine 
democratic accountability.465 As the Supreme Court explained in the 
2006 case of Randall v. Sorrell, extremely low contribution limits “harm 
the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting 
effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing 
democratic accountability.”466 The justices should take a similarly 
skeptical approach to nakedly partisan election laws that burden voting 
rights. 
In hyperpolarized America, the fact is neither party can be trusted 
on its own to do the right thing when it comes to administering state 
and federal elections. Accordingly, in evaluating election law changes 
that put additional burdens on voting rights, the courts should take into 
consideration whether the new law elicited broad bipartisan support or 
was instead adopted by a party-line vote. If courts embrace the idea of 
reversing the Burdick test, a bipartisan supermajority principle could 
serve as one criterion for assessing whether the state has met its burden 
in overcoming the presumption of invalidity. The principle is simple and 
easy to apply. Under it, a state could support its argument that an 
election law change is necessary by showing that the law received 
support from a bipartisan supermajority of two-thirds of the legislature. 
 
 462.  Douglas, supra note 301, at 556. 
 463.  Id. at 555–56. 
 464.  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 
(1980). 
 465.  See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006) (striking down Vermont’s low 
contribution limits on grounds that they “burden First Amendment interests in a manner that is 
disproportionate to the public purposes they were enacted to advance”). 
 466.  Id. at 232. 
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Under the bipartisan supermajority principle, at least one-third of the 
members of the minority party must vote in favor of the voting law 
change. Embracing the supermajority principle for voting laws would 
help courts assess whether a partisan motive is the real force behind an 
election “integrity” measure. 
The bipartisan element is crucial to the supermajority criterion. In 
an America sharply divided into red and blue, a simple supermajority 
principle will not be effective in every state. For example, a two-thirds 
majority rule would not prevent deeply red states like Alabama—
where Republicans hold large majorities—and deeply blue states like 
Massachusetts—where Democrats hold large majorities—from 
enacting voting laws in a party-line vote. Republicans currently hold a 
72 to 33 seat majority in the Alabama House of Representatives and a 
26 to 8 seat majority in the Alabama State Senate.467 Democrats 
currently hold a 125 to 35 seat majority in the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives and a 34 to 6 seat majority in the Massachusetts State 
Senate.468 Such large margins make it possible for the majority party to 
achieve supermajorities in support of legislation even if not a single 
member of the minority party supports the law. Thus, by requiring that 
supermajorities cross partisan lines, the risk of a party-line 
supermajority vote is eliminated. 
In an ideal world, party leaders would adopt the bipartisan 
supermajority rule out of a sense of patriotic devotion to America’s 
democratic institutions. But that is obviously not a sensibility that is 
broadly shared in American politics today. In an age of 
hyperpolarization, party leaders and rank-and-file party members view 
bipartisanship as an act of political heresy. Thus, for the time being at 
least, the only hope for bipartisanship in election administration is if 
the courts require it. 
There are limits to the bipartisan supermajority principle. The 
courts should not require that every election law change receive the 
support of a bipartisan supermajority. The United States is founded on 
a principle of majority rule, not supermajority rule, and courts should 
be sensitive to that fact. But even the Constitution itself requires 
 
 467.  See Alabama’s 2014 Elections, BALLOTPEDIA https://ballotpedia.org/Alabama_ 
elections,_2014; Alabama House of Representatives elections, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA 
https://ballotpedia.org/Alabama_State_Senate_elections,_2014.  
 468.  See Massachusetts House of Representatives, BALLOTPEDIA https://ballotpedia.org/ 
Massachusetts_House_of_Representatives; Massachusetts State Senate, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Massachusetts_State_Senate.  
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supermajorities in certain cases, such as to override a presidential 
veto,469 to ratify a treaty,470 to convict on impeachment,471 or to amend 
the Constitution itself.472 Voting rights are so central to a healthy 
democracy that they merit special safeguards as well. Courts will thus 
need to be both creative and cautious in crafting the constitutional 
basis for a bipartisan supermajority principle in voting rights cases. 
History shows that the courts absolutely have the capacity to develop 
narrowly focused election law doctrines that protect Constitutional 
rights and democratic principles. In the 1960s the Supreme Court 
developed the “One Person, One Vote” doctrine to require equal 
population in legislative and congressional redistricting.473 The moment 
has come for similar judicial creativity, precision, and boldness in this 
hyperpolarized political era. At a time when the political parties 
increasingly view each other as a threat to the nation’s well-being, 
aggressive judicial intervention to defend voting rights is appropriate 
and necessary. 
If at some future date the two parties manage to pull themselves 
out of the mutually destructive cycle of hyperpolarization, it would be 
possible for Republicans and Democrats to find common ground in 
election administration. There are sensible good government reforms 
that can and should be undertaken in bipartisan fashion to ensure the 
security of the election process. One area of election administration 
that badly needs bipartisan attention is America’s outdated voter 
registration system. As discussed above, a 2012 study by the Pew Center 
found 24 million outdated or inaccurate voter registration records.474 In 
contrast to Canada, which relies on a nationwide electronic registration 
system, most American states still rely on costly, inefficient, and error 
prone paper registration processes.475 In 2014 the bipartisan 
Presidential Commission on Election Administration proposed a series 
of reforms to the election administration system, including the creation 
 
 469.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 470.  Id. art. II, § 2. 
 471.  Id. art. I, § 3. 
 472.  Id. art. V.  
 473.  See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of political equality 
from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”); 
see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 13 (1964) (“The debates at the Convention make at least 
one fact abundantly clear: that when the delegates agreed that the House should represent 
‘people’ they intended that in allocating Congressmen the number assigned to each State should 
be determined solely by the number of the State’s inhabitants.”). 
 474.  PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 269, at 1.  
 475.  Id. at 2, 3. 
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of a national online voter registration database and the modernization 
of the states’ voting technology.476 A bipartisan commitment to 
allocating sufficient funds to modernize and standardize the voter 
registration system and voting rolls along the lines proposed by the 
Presidential Commission is a reasonable reform to expect from 
Congress and the state legislatures. 
Even voter ID laws could one day achieve a bipartisan consensus if 
drafted in an inclusive way. The nationwide issuance of free 
government-issued photo IDs would be a sensible measure for 
improving election security without disenfranchising voters. One of the 
most promising proposals is to add photos to Social Security cards.477 
Every American already receives a Social Security card for free from 
the government.478 Adding a photograph to the card would thus enable 
virtually every American, regardless of socio-economic status, to 
possess a government-issued photo ID. The Social Security card photo 
would satisfy the election security goals of proponents of voter ID laws 
while alleviating the concerns of opponents of such laws that the poor 
will be disenfranchised by a lack of access to a government-issued 
photo ID. Whatever form of government issued identification is 
required, it is essential that the government provide the necessary 
forms of identification for free to the poor and infirm, including 
supporting documents such as birth certificates. It is also long overdue 
for the state governments to automatically register all qualified voters. 
As the Brennan Center for Justice has argued, automatic voter 
registration “boosts registration rates, cleans up the rolls, makes voting 
more convenient, and reduces the potential for voter fraud, all while 
lowering costs.” 479  
 
 476.  PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING 
EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON 
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 3–4 (2014) https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2014/01/ Amer-
Voting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf.  
 477.  Juliet Eilperin & Karen Tumulty, Democrats embrace adding photos to Social Security 
cards, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democrats-
embrace-adding-photos-to-social-security-cards/2014/04/10/cfffe55a-c0cc-11e3-b574-f8748871856 
a_story.html?utm_term=.d8274dcf2f9a; Juliet Eilperin, Trump meets with Martin Luther King III 
on Monday to discuss voting rights, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/01/16/trump-to-meet-with-martin-luther-king-iii-on-monday-to-
discuss-voting-rights/?utm_term=.e6665024e73a.  
 478.  SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., NEW OR REPLACEMENT SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER AND 
CARD, https://www.ssa.gov/ssnumber; Carolyn Puckett, The Story of the Social Security Number, 
69 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 55 (2009), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v69n2/ssb-v69n2.pdf.  
 479.  BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., AUTOMATIC VOTER REGISTRATION (2017), https://www. 
brennancenter.org/analysis/automatic-voter-registration. 
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In a non-polarized political climate in which traditional democratic 
norms prevail, many other sensible election law reforms would be 
attainable. Indeed, there is no doubt that genuine efforts to protect 
election integrity are valid and important. As the Supreme Court has 
emphasized, “A State indisputably has a compelling interest in 
preserving the integrity of its election process.”480 But voting rights are 
equally important. In Purcell v. Gonzalez,481 the Court explained that 
election administration involves a balance between “the State’s 
compelling interest in preventing voter fraud” and eligible citizens’ 
“strong interest in exercising the ‘fundamental political right’ to 
vote.”482 Congress and the state legislatures can strike the right balance 
between those competing interests, but only if they act in a bipartisan 
fashion. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States is not an illiberal democracy yet, but the warning 
signs are clear. In this time of extreme polarization, partisans are 
incentivized to break with democratic norms and adopt tactics that 
undermine voting rights and destabilize democratic institutions. The 
inevitable result is a cycle of escalation. The United States is already in 
the early stages of that cycle, and judicial intervention is now required 
before partisan escalation reaches the point of no return. 
Accordingly, in this perilous era, the state and federal courts must 
embrace a renewed commitment to defending America’s democratic 
institutions in general, and voting rights in particular, from partisan 
attacks. The time for judicial passivity in voting rights is over. As the 
Supreme Court explained in Wesberry v. Sanders,483 “[n]o right is more 
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of 
those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.”484 
Above all, structural changes are necessary to preserve and maintain 
America’s democratic institutions for the long run. The success of any 
democracy depends on establishing clear rules that are administered in 
a fair and transparent way. Democracy is about more than just winners 
and losers—it is about institutions that fairly administer elections to 
 
 480.  Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989). 
 481.  549 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 482.  Id. at 4. 
 483.  376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 484.  Id. at 17. 
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ensure that the voters’ will is heard.485 As James Madison once 
observed, “no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because 
his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, 
corrupt his integrity.”486 
Madison’s principle of neutrality must guide us in election 
administration today. The historical record makes it starkly apparent 
that partisan control of the election administration process is a threat 
to the long-term vitality of American democracy. Left unchecked, 
partisans will always craft election rules to favor their party and 
disadvantage their opponents. The threat is particularly dangerous at a 
time of hyperpolarization. Accordingly, Americans must build 
structural safeguards into our election system to guard against the 
machinations of partisan extremism. As George Washington explained 
in his Farewell Address, “the common and continual mischiefs of the 
spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise 
people to discourage and restrain it.”487 The fate of American 
democracy depends on whether we heed Washington’s advice. 
 
 485.  See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 183, at 644 (“The democratic politics we experience 
is not an autonomous realm of parties, public opinion, and elections, but a product of specific 
institutional structures and legal rules.”). 
 486.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Mary Carolyn Waldrep & Jim Miller 
eds., 2014). 
 487.  George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), reprinted in SPEECHES OF THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 17, 21 (Janet Podell & Steven Anzovin eds., 2d ed. 2001). 
